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THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT POWER
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Theodore W Ruger
[J]udges are as honest as other men, and not more so.... I doubt if the
fathers of the Republican party would have consented to intrust that
power [of special court appointment] to Chief Justice Taney, the author
of the Dred Scott decision.... Now, sir, there is no reason why we
should affect such a sentimentality to-day.'
A Court, in making such an appointment, exercises not a judicial,
but... a merely naked power.
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional democracy of the United States reposes signifi-
cant public authority in the hands of unelected and life-tenured fed-
eral judges. This fact is well studied by legal academics, as questions
regarding the scope, contours, and legitimacy of the judicial power
have preoccupied constitutional law discourse for at least a century.
As the federal judiciary has grown both in size and assertiveness over
the past fifty years, such issues have become more pressing and per-
haps more contested, giving rise to an entire field of legal thought
addressing what has come to be known as the "countermajoritarian
difficulty"-the alleged paradox of unelected officials exercising
great power in a democracy.'
These debates continue to rage, and will do so into the foresee-
able future. Yet within the framework of debate there is generally a
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45 CONG. REc. 7351 (1910) (statement of Senator Gore in opposition to giving the Chief
Justice appointment atthority over Commerce Court judges).
2 In reHennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 235-36 (1839) (argument of petitioner).
3 The literature in this area is too voluminous to cite here. For a thoughtful summary and
critique of the field, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
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shared agreement about certain structural features of the American
judiciary that render judicial review less objectionable both in theory
and in practical operation. One of these baseline compromises is ex-
plicit in the Constitution's text-the proposition that federal judges,
though life-tenured, are appointed to their seats through a political
process. Judicial authority is thus rendered more democratic because
the discretion to choose judges lies in the political arena. This fun-
damental constitutional bargain-judges generally insulated from
public pressure but chosen with popular input-is a key component
of the standard theoretical defense of judicial review against accusa-
tions of excessive "countermajoritarianism." So important is this up
front public input that the Constitution does not vest appointment
authority in just one elected body, but instead bifurcates the power
between the President and the Senate. Leading descriptive accounts
of judicial behavior also stress the importance of the selection proc-
ess, asserting, for instance, that the Supreme Court generally tracks
the nation's political center precisely because of the role of the po-
litical branches in the appointment process.4 The selection ofjudges
by two different political branches is also discourse-generating; the
public, through its elected representatives, debates the kind ofjurists
it prefers to sit on particular federal courts.
This basic appointment power strikes a separation of powers bal-
ance, placing the discretion to choose judges outside of the judiciary
itself. But even within Article III, in the internal architecture and op-
eration of the federal judicial power, there exist norms and practices
that likewise serve to soften concerns about the grant of too much
power to particular unelected judges. Three of these adjudicative
norms in particular are germane to this Article in ways that will be
explained at greater length below. First, the decisions that judges
make-at least those most relevant to the adjudicative enterprise-
are typically justified by opinions giving express reasons for them.
Second, Article III decision making is embedded in a collective deci-
sional structure, as individual judges are situated in a corporate en-
terprise with lines of authority and agreement running vertically (re-
view by a higher court) and horizontally (the norm of majority
opinions by multimember courts and appellate panels). Finally,
there is a longstanding norm in Article III adjudication against stra-
tegically steering particular kinds of cases to particular kinds of
judges, and a preference instead for case assignment mechanisms
that, if not wholly random, are at least regularized.
4 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (arguing that the Court rarely contradicts the views of a po-
litical majority).
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Given these structural features and norms of behavior that typi-
cally accompany the exercise of Article III authority, we might view
any arrangement Congress makes that divests the political branches
of the power to choose the judges who comprise important federal
courts with skepticism, particularly where the discretion to choose
judges is placed in the hands of a single judicial official operating
outside of the normal Article III decisional constraints. Our concerns
might be further heightened when the subject matter jurisdiction of
the judicial bodies to be filled is narrow and specific, giving the ap-
pointing officer the ability to strategically match a particular kind of
judge with a particular kind of case. But Congress has made several
such transfers of the judicial appointment power to the Chief Justice
of the United States in the past few decades. Various federal statutes
vest the Chief Justice with the power to choose, from among hun-
dreds of existing Article III judges, the members of special judicial
bodies who hear disputes and make decisions in several important
policy areas: the fight against international terrorism, immigration
and deportation,6 mass tort litigation,' and (until recently) the inde-
pendent investigation of the conduct of executive branch officials in-
cluding the President." Although this power to appoint mirrors the
President's Article II nomination authority, it is even more absolute
because it is not subject to Senate confirmation, or to input from any
other official. The power is also frequently recurring. Because the
spots on these specialized courts are numerous in the aggregate, and
because appointments are time-limited (typically to five or seven
years), the current Chief Justice has made over fifty such special court
appointments, filling more federal judicial seats than did every indi-
vidual United States President before Ulysses S. Grant.9
This special appointment power is functionally similar to, and his-
torically derivative of, the general judicial designation power that the
5 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (b), (d) (2004) (giving the Chief Justice the power to designate
eleven federal district court judges to serve in seven-year terms on the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court, which reviews and decides government applications for electronic surveillance,
and three circuitjudges to sit on an appellate panel).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2004) (giving the Chief Justice the power to designate five federal
district court judges to serve in five-year terms on the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, which
hears all alien removal proceedings).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2004) (giving the Chief Justice the power to designate five to
seven district or circuit court judges to serve on the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 49(a), (d) (1994) (establishing a special "division" of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, comprised of three judges designated by the Chief Justice "for the purpose of
appointing independent counsels."); see also Independent Counsel Reform Act of 2003, S. 1712,
108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (amending the statute to require the Chief Justice to appoint these
judges "by a lottery").
9 See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts: Federal Judges Biographi-
cal Database, at http://www.jc.gov/newweb/netweb.nsf/hisj (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
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Chief Justice has exercised in various degrees at least since the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, and which is employed often today
when one federal judge temporarily sits on another court. But there
is an important conceptual difference between the two powers. Al-
though the act in both cases is the same (a temporary appointment of
an existing judge to a different court), the substantive choice antece-
dent to the act is fundamentally different when the transferee court is
specialized in nature-where, in other words, the ChiefJustice knows
precisely the type of matter the designated judge will rule upon.
Most courts in the federal system have generalized jurisdiction and
systematic case assignment mechanisms, meaning that the basic reas-
signment authority poses only indirect danger of strategic impact on
case outcomes. This is not so with the special court appointment
power studied here, which vests the Chief Justice with the unilateral
discretion to select certain kinds of judges to hear certain kinds of
matters, thereby potentially affecting results.
Although typically made with scant public attention-perhaps an
additional problematic feature of the power-the Chief Justice's ap-
pointment choices have occasionally been noticed and criticized in
the aftermath of high profile actions by particular special courts.
Many observers in the late 1990s criticized Chief Justice William
Rehnquist's selection of Judge David Sentelle, a former Republican
Party official, to head the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit that ap-
pointed Kenneth Starr as Independent Counsel to investigate Presi-
dent Clinton.0 More recently, some media commentators noted
Chief Justice Rehnquist's choice of three Republican-appointed
judges to staff the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")
Court of Review in the wake of that body's ruling in favor of the gov-
ernment, reversing the lower FISA Court's denial of surveillance au-
thority."
This Article examines this special appointment power of the Chief
Justice along three different dimensions: historical, theoretical, and
empirical. Part I addresses a basic historical question-how did this
to See, e.g., Steve Daley, Choice of Starr Has Partisan Smel, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1994, at 4 (de-
bating the selection of Kenneth Starr due to his Republican affiliation); Michael Kramer, Fade
Away, Starr, TIME, Aug. 29, 1994, at 37 (urging Starr to quit his new position as Whitewater In-
dependent Counsel); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons from History: Why
There Must Be an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 10 (2000) (describing the
Starr/Sentelle appointments and noting the "great danger" that "a conservative Chief Jus-
tice .. is perceived as likely to select conservative judges.").
n See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that
surveillance of an agent does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as a "significant pur-
pose" of that surveillance is foreign intelligence); see, e.g., Karen Branch-Brioso, Court Approves
New Wiretap Powers, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 2002, at Al (noting a decision by "three
federal judges appointed by President Ronald Reagan and tapped to the review court by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist.").
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power develop in the American constitutional regime, both as an ac-
tual statutory device employed by Congress and as a conceptual norm
with which American politicians and judges are generally comfort-
able? The power is not an original or inherent feature of the Chief
Justice's office, and Part I details its early roots and significant expan-
sion in the early twentieth century. Part II is conceptual, analyzing
both the doctrinal constitutionality of the practice and its deeper
theoretical implications. I conclude that although not doctrinally
"unconstitutional," in the sense that a court would, or should, invali-
date it, the device is troubling for several reasons, which suggest that
Congress should use it sparingly, and in different forms than it cur-
rently does. Part III assesses the actual appointment choices of Chief
Justices Burger and Rehnquist (the two who have had the most mean-
ingful special court appointment authority), and a related Appendix
lists the appointments (over 100 in total) made by these two men.
These three separate strands of analysis are, of course, related.
The historical discussion in Part I informs contemporary considera-
tion of the constitutional doctrine and theory in two ways. First, the
fact that courts and judges have long exercised some kind of ap-
pointment power, and for the past century the Chief Justice has exer-
cised significant executive authority over the federal judiciary, sup-
ports the basic constitutionality of the practice; courts have so held
on the few occasions where they squarely addressed the issue. Most
of the specialized courts studied here have survived constitutional at-
tack, and one can put together a reasonable case grounded in history,
text, and precedent in support of the Chief Justice's appointment au-
thority to fill special court judicial seats that would satisfy all but the
most rigid standard of separation of powers formalism. This Article
does not take issue with this doctrinal conclusion, and does not revisit
the separation of powers concerns raised by the specialized tribunals
themselves. Nor does the Article undertake a broad exploration of
the full sweep of the judiciary's (and the ChiefJustice's) multifaceted
administrative powers, of the sort found in works by Peter Fish, Judith
Resnik, Stephen Burbank, and others. 12 Rather, it is a more focused
12 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U PA. L. REv. 1015, 1050-
1158 (1982) (exploring history of, and experience with, federal court rulemaking authority);
Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics and FederalJudicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act of 1939,
32 J. POL. 599, 621 (1970) (describing the growth of the Chief Justice's office, including the
view that the Chief Justice could be held "as the responsible officer" for "administrative prob-
lems in faraway courts"); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,
and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 232-70 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, Constricting Remedies]
(discussing the Rehnquist Court's refusal to expand the judiciary's equitable powers); Judith
Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women
Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 269, 283-93 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary] (ana-
lyzing the policy impact and effects of judicial preoccupation with offering advice); Judith Res-
nik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article II, 113 HARV. L. REV.
Nov. 20041
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inquiry into several dimensions of one anomalous feature of the
ChiefJustice's power.
As noted above, there is no claim here that the Supreme Court, or
any other court, should rule this type of appointment power uncon-
stitutional. To say the practice is "constitutional" in this doctrinal
sense, however, does not resolve the theoretical difficulties it poses.
Not every choice that Congress can make-within the parameters of
the judicially-enforceable Constitution-is one that it should make,
and some structural innovations put more strain on the Constitu-
tion's baseline assumptions than others. The remainder of Part II
explores the problematic features of Congress's delegation of the ap-
pointment power to the Chief Justice from the perspective of consti-
tutional theory and history. Most of these objections derive from the
fact that this kind of unconstrained selection power, coupled with the
specialized subject matter of the courts at issue, confers on the Chief
Justice the ability, whether exercised or not, to directly match particu-
lar judges with particular types of cases and thereby influence out-
comes. Moreover, unlike most power exercised by federal judges, it is
unilateral, without any check from any collective body of other
judges.
In light of these concerns, I argue that Congress should employ
this appointment device with caution, and I propose some preferable
alternatives-both for Congress in giving and the Chief Justice in ex-
ercising the power. Historical practice and case law make clear that
Congress has several options to choose from in selecting a process for
filling up the judicial vacancies on a new specialized court. It often
mirrors the Article II nomination and consent procedure even for
non-life-tenured judges (for example, the Tax Court and Court of
Veterans Appeals), and when Congress involves the judiciary in staff-
ing a new specialist body with existing Article III judges, there is im-
portant precedent in the Sentencing Guidelines Commission' for
giving appointment authority to a collective group of judges (such as
924 (2000) (discussing the effects of a changing judiciary throughout the twentieth century).
See also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEFJUSTICE (1984) (addressing generally the
various administrative powers of the ChiefJustice).
13 The United States Sentencing Commission has up to three members who are sitting Arti-
cle III judges chosen from a list submitted to the President by the Judicial Conference of the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the
Court upheld this appointment arrangement and other aspects of the Commission's structure
and authority against a constitutional challenge. Congress recently amended the statute (via
the "Feeney Amendment") to limit the number of judges who could serve on the commission at
any one time to three. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 675-76 (2003). None of
the important constitutional questions about the Sentencing Guidelines raised by Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9 (2004) (declining to examine the constitutionality of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines), and its progeny relate to this basic judicial appointment mecha-
nism.
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the entire Judicial Conference) rather than to the Chief Justice alone.
Such alternatives, in addition to others discussed, would operate to
constrain (or remove altogether) the current broad discretion that
the Chief Justice holds.
The last section of this Article is a preliminary effort to collect, re-
cord, and assess the complete special court appointment record of
the two Chief Justices who have exercised the authority most fre-
quently, Warren Burger and William Rehnquist. The Appendix to
this Article lists the special court appointments that these two Chief
Justices have made, and Part III is an initial exploration of the man-
ner in which Chief Justices have exercised this power. The appoint-
ment record suggests that the special designation power has been at
least occasionally exercised in strategic terms to advance the particu-
lar substantive preferences of the ChiefJustice.
I. THE RISE OF THE CHIEFJUSTICE'S EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
Judges should be independent in their judgments, but they should be
subject to some executive direction as to the use of their services, and
somebody should be made responsible for the whole business of the United
States.1
4
More than any other major constitutional office, the powers and
stature of the modern Chief Justice are a creation of historical devel-
opment rather than textual provision or original constitutional de-
sign. 15 Article III of the Constitution does not mention the Chief Jus-
tice, and the office appears only once in the entire document, in
Article I's requirement that the Chief Justice should preside in the
Senate during an impeachment trial of the President. 6 Although the
Framers debated questions of the proper role of the judiciary and the
14 William H. Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A.J. 34, 35 (1922).
15 For the most comprehensive treatment of this development through two centuries of
American history, see ROBERTJ. STEAMER, CHIEFJUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1986). See also id. at 4-9 (noting the historical development of the office). This comparative
claim does not ignore the fact that the President's power has grown and changed dramatically
through history, in ways that the Framers might not have foreseen. Article II and its original
understanding, however, provided for at least the basic structure of meaningful executive au-
thority, whereas Article III is totally silent as to the Chief Justice.
16 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside .... ."). As I discuss below, it is instructive that the single mention of
the Chief Justice in the original Constitution is in the role of a neutral arbiter of disputes be-
tween the other two branches. Several of the twentieth-century efforts to vest appointment
power with the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court were motivated in significant part by con-
gressional desire to provide a reasonably neutral check on executive authority. See infra Part I.B
(discussing the failed effort to vest appointment of the Comptroller General with the Supreme
Court and the successful transfer of appointment power over independent counsels and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act tribunals).
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selection of Justices for the Supreme Court, they rarely mentioned
the Chief Justiceship or its specific functions. Nor did John Jay, the
original occupant of the post, seem to think it a particularly compel-
ling occupation; he performed part of his work from abroad and re-
signed the office to serve as governor of New York in 1794.17 By the
twentieth century, such a career choice became so unthinkable that
Felix Frankfurter fairly stated that "only a madman, a certified mad-
man" would swap offices as Jay did. 8
While the office has evolved over two centuries and has involved
many individuals and influences, it is possible to identify two men
who held the post who are most responsible for the Chief Justice's
modern power and status. The first of these, of course, is John Mar-
shall; the other is William Howard Taft. Marshall's influence is well-
known and foundational; through a series of judicial decisions over
the course of several decades, he played a pivotal role in shaping the
contours ofjudicial power in America. Under his leadership, the Su-
preme Court articulated its authority to review both the actions of the
coordinate branches of the federal government 9 and the rulings of
state high courts.20 The Court further helped to solidify the power of
the new national government.2' In no small way Marshall essentially
defined the institution of American courts, and he contributed par-
tially to the making of the federal government itself. As perceived in
almost mythic form by later generations of Americans, his influence
has persisted, and perhaps even grown, after his death. New asser-
tions of judicial authority are regularly justified by invoking the man
and his most famous opinions.
Marshall's contribution to the American judiciary was so sweeping
that it is much bigger than the particular office he held. By promot-
ing the idea of robustjudicial review, Marshall increased the power of
all American judges and courts. Furthermore, by solidifying the Su-
I CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 128 (1st ed. 1990). Jay de-
clined a second nomination to the ChiefJusticeship in 1800, in part because he felt the Court
lacked "'the energy, weight, and dignity which are essential to its affording due support to the
national government.'" Id.
1s Felix Frankfurter, ChiefJustices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 884 (1953).
19 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
20 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (articulating the Court's power to
review state court decisions arising under federal law); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816) (holding that the Court has absolute appellate power over state tribu-
nals under the Constitution).
2 See McCullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (articulating the suprem-
acy of the federal government and the Constitution).
22 See, e.g., ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1989)
(describing Marbury as having "taken on a symbolic significance which it did not possess at the
hour of its decision.").
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preme Court as the preeminent interpretive authority on matters of
federal law, Marshall undoubtedly raised the stature of the institution
and its Justices. But most of this institutional accretion did not lead
to an increase in the authority of the Chief Justiceship itself as op-
posed to the Court as an institution. Marshall's actions as Chief Jus-
tice undoubtedly increased the general stature of the post, both con-
temporaneously and for later occupants, however the magisterial
leadership that Marshall exercised was only a potentiality of the office
rather than an inherent attribute. The ChiefJustice's actual ability to
lead is dependent on he or she possessing at least some of what Mar-
shall had: unusual persuasive authority, longevity of service, and,
perhaps most importantly, enough like-minded colleagues.
Even today, the Chief Justice's unique influence within the Su-
preme Court's core adjudicative enterprise is limited, and both case
outcomes in recent terms and prevailing academic attitudes toward
Supreme Court decision making in law and political science confirm
this proposition. The standard attitudinal model that has predomi-
nated until recently among empirical political scientists who study the
Court ascribes no special weight to the Chief Justice's vote, instead
treating it as one of nine equal covariates for modeling purposes.2,
Similarly, most law professors who comment on the Court recognize
the crucial outcome-determinative status of the views of the Justices at
the ideological center of the Court's voting array, even going so far as
to occasionally label the current Supreme Court the "Kennedy
Court," or, more commonly, the "O'Connor Court," in lieu of the
conventional "Rehnquist Court., 24 This basic proposition was borne
out in several recent prominent cases, such as Lawrence v. Texa 5 and
Grutter v. Bollinger, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
23 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 242-55 (1993) (treating the Chief Justice's vote as equivalent to those of
otherjustices for modeling purposes).
24 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices, Not Theory, De-
ternine Constitutional Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 377 ("For better or worse, this really is the
O'Connor Court."). A similar dynamic takes place in much academic commentary on the
"Warren Court," where, despite the name, many scholars ascribe primary jurisprudential lead-
ership to William Brennan, not Earl Warren. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OFJUSTICE 8 (1998) (describing Justice Brennan as "the most impor-
tant intellectual influence on the Warren Court."). But see L.A. SCOT POWE, THE WARREN
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) 499-500 (rebutting the claim that Justice Brennan was
the intellectual leader of the Warren Court).
25 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy to be in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause).
26 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the use of race-based admissions criteria at the University
of Michigan Law School).
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Linda Greenhouse described the Supreme Court's most recent Term
as "the one when ChiefJustice William Rehnquist lost his court.
2 7
The Chief Justice possesses several institutional powers that can af-
fect Court decision making in important ways. The Chief Justice con-
trols opinion assignment (but only if in the majority) 28 and has some
authority over the Court's docket (although the other Justices can
override this decision). Some political science studies have sug-
gested that the Chief Justice is able to exercise some additional au-
thority through agenda control, and generalized persuasive authority,
but these accounts recognize that such internal strategic leadership-
in an institution with eight other confident decision makers with life
tenure-only has a limited effect on the Court's outcomes.
For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court's adjudicative func-
tion does not capture exclusively, or even primarily, the full extent of
the modern Chief Justice's power. Much of the Chief's unique au-
thority is administrative and bureaucratic, and includes the particular
appointment power discussed here as well as other important roles,
such as presiding over the Federal Judicial Conference.m Under-
standing the rise of this power requires some historical attention to
the early decades of the twentieth century, when William Howard
Taft and other like-minded judicial reformers worked a conceptual
and administrative transformation of the Chief's role in the American
judiciary. A key component of this effort was a significant enhance-
ment in the ChiefJustice's discretionary authority to transfer existing
federal judges from one court to another within the federal system.
This power is a generalized precursor to a power which, later in the
twentieth century, Congress increasingly made even more specific,
enabling the Chief Justice to appoint existing federal judges to par-
ticular specialized courts.
The Taft-era reforms laid the foundation for the modern special
appointment authority of the Chief Justice in two ways. First, a cen-
tral feature of the Taftian reform program entailed the promulgation
of two related ideas about the operation of the federal judiciary: the
presumption of interchangeability of federal judges (e.g., that a given
27 Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at
Al (noting the "invisibility of ChiefJustice Rehnquist" in some of the Term's leading cases).
28 WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., COURTS, JUDGES & POLITICS 618 (2002); Forrest Maltzman &
PaulJ. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM.J. POL.
SCI. 421 (1996) (discussing the Chief Justice's authority to assign majority opinions); see also
Warren Richey, The Quiet Ascent ofJustice Stevens, CHRISTIAN S0. MONITOR, July 9, 2004 (describ-
ing Justice Stevens's crucial role in opinion assignment in several cases where the Chief Justice
was in dissent), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0709/pOlsO3-usju.html.
29 See MURPHY, supra note 28, at 610 (describing the Chief Justice's "special role" in the se-
lection process).
30 For a discussion on the Chief Justice's potential to affect policy in this presiding role, see
Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciamy, sura note 12, at 284-88.
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judge could temporarily fill a geographically distinct judicial seat),
and the executive authority of the Chief Justice in determining and
executing such judicial transfers. Both of these conceptions were
critical to Taft's reform efforts, and both are historical and theoreti-
cal preconditions for the special court appointment authority that
the Chief Justice exercises today. Neither idea went uncontested at
the time, and the story of the early twentieth-century opposition to
this program sheds light on the troublesome features of the modern
judicial appointment power. Part L.A tells the story of these reforms
with an emphasis on the rise of these twin basic conceptions-the al-
locative authority of the Chief Justice over a federal judiciary that was
at least partially interchangeable.
Part I.B more specifically examines the rise of the special judicial
appointment power that is the subject of this Article, which also had
roots in the early twentieth century. During Taft's tenure as Presi-
dent, Congress for the first time considered a statute (establishing the
Commerce Court) which vested the Chief Justice with the power to
select judges to sit on a specialized Article III tribunal. This initial ef-
fort generated significant opposition. Such was not the case later in
the century, when Congress shed its reluctance to confer such au-
thority on the Chief Justice, and did so with increasing frequency af-
ter World War II. This feature of the historical story is less about ju-
dicial power than about congressional path dependence, as what was
once a controversial delegation of the appointment power became an
accepted statutory device.
This history is an interesting story in itself, but it is also relevant in
two somewhat countervailing ways to the constitutional discussion
that follows later in the Article. First, every type of power conferred
on the Chief Justice was similar in kind to something that had gone
before, and no individual statute gravely altered the prior constitu-
tional regime. Once the Chief Justice had extensive authority to
transfer judges from one generalist federal court to another, it was a
small conceptual leap (although one with important theoretical dif-
ferences, as I explore below) to confer similar appointment authority
to place existing federal judges on specialized judicial bodies. It is
thus difficult to make a strong claim that it is "unconstitutional," at
least in the modern sense, that a federal court should tell Congress
that it cannot so allocate the appointment function.
Second, although the gradual accretion of the Chief's appoint-
ment authority makes it difficult to assail its doctrinal constitutional-
ity, the historical story also demonstrates a different point: there is
nothing inherent or original in the vast appointment and transfer au-
thority that the current Chief Justice possesses. It represents a choice
by twentieth-century Congress-a permissible choice, but not the
only one available for staffing specialized bodies that Congress cre-
ates in the future. Where difficulties exist based on political theory
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or empirical evidence, Congress should reconsider the use of this de-
vice. Later sections of this Article discuss these problems and several
alternatives.
A. Taft and the "Executive Principle" Applied to theJudiciay
As noted above, John Marshall's primary historical influence was
connected with the Supreme Court's adjudicative role-the authority
with which the Court decides cases and the reception of those hold-
ings by other governmental actors and by the American public. Befit-
ting this central jurisprudential role, the modern Supreme Court
building memorialized Marshall as a brooding seated figure whose
distant neutral gaze embodies the mythic conception of "the Great
Chief Justice"3' who discerns and declares the enduring legal princi-
ples to guide the nation's constitutional development. A different
kind of monument just as aptly symbolizes William Howard Taft's
significant contribution to the scope of the modem Chief Justice's
power, although few Court visitors ever see this monument, and it
bears the name of another Justice. The Thurgood Marshall Federal
Judicial Building, tucked next to Washington D.C.'s Union Station,
houses a few judges and most of the hundreds of administrators,
clerks, and researchers who staff the Federal Judicial Conference and
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. These judicial
agencies are manifestations of Taft's vision of a bureaucratized, effi-
cient judiciary-with, significantly, the Chief Justice as its executive
head.
Taft, the only individual to hold the offices of both President and
Chief Justice, was as energetic and visionary a court reformer as has
ever occupied either post. He recognized and repeatedly acknowl-
edged this focus of his intellectual energy, stating at one point: "I
love judges and I love courts. They are my ideals on earth of what we
shall meet afterward in Heaven under a just God."3  Others noticed
as well. Felix Frankfurter, no ally of Taft in terms of substantive juris-
prudence, nonetheless thought Taft was a great "law reformer," de-
serving "a place in history... next to Oliver Ellsworth, who originally
devised the judicial system."3  Louis Brandeis concurred, remarking
that, "it's astonishing [that Taft] should have been such a horribly
31 For an example of this commonly used phrase, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962).
32 Daniel S. McHargue, President Taft's Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12J. POL. 478, 478
(1950).
33 Robert Post, Taft and the Administration ofJustice, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 311, 312 (1999).
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bad President, for he has considerable executive ability. The fact,
probably, is that he cared about law all the time [and] nothing else."34
Taft's conception of the federal judiciary as a hierarchical organi-
zation, and of the Chief Justice as its head, was fundamentally differ-
ent from the theory and practice that prevailed in the nineteenth
century. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth,
the various courts were generally independent, not just from the
other branches of government, but also from each other.35 To be
sure, lower federal judges operated in a hierarchical system of review
when hearing cases, and had to conform their holdings to existing
precedent or risk being overruled by a higher court. 6 But in virtually
all of their administrative functions, each court operated as a separate
entity, closely linked to its particular geographic district. The mobil-
ity of judges that Taft envisioned, which underlies the Chief Justice's
special court appointment power today, "ran counter to all tradi-
tional conceptions of American judicial organization. 37 The first Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 made no provision for the temporary transfer of
one district judge to another district, and as such, the inability of a
judge to act meant court adjournment.38 Each district court hired its
own clerk and retained exclusive power of removal.3 9  The clerks
themselves received no salaries from Washington, but instead paid
themselves out of litigants' fees.40 This localism helped facilitate the
gradual public acceptance of the federal judicial presence in the
Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUp. CT. REV. 299, 313 (quot-
ing a statement made by Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter on June 28, 1923).
35 See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 217 (1928) (stating that until World War I, "neither
Congress nor the profession thought much about those elements of organization and admini-
stration called for by all modern judicial systems."); see also ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM
HOWARD TAF-r: CHIEFJUSTICE 100 (1964) ("Judges must be kept independent not only of the
President and Congress but also of each other."). See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra,
(describing the history of the Supreme Court from the period prior to the Civil War through
the Judiciary Act of 1925).
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315
(1999) (examining the operation of the independent judicial branch); Charles Gardner Geyh,
Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH 160 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (discussing the incompati-
bility ofjudicial independence and accountability).
37 FRANFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 35, at 219.
Seech. 20, § 6, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789) ("[A] district court, in case of the inability of the judge
to attend at the commencement of a session, may ... be adjourned .... ."). Not until 1850 did
anything like the modern transfer authority arise, and even then it permitted transfer of district
judges only within the same circuit or the next contiguous circuit. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, su-
pra note 35, at 219 n.3.
39 Federal Judicial Center, Judicial Administration and Organization: Court Officers and
Staff: Clerks of Court, at http://www.fc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/hisa (last visited Oct. 1,
2004).
40 Id.
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states, as federal district judges were free to modify their procedures
in ways more consistent with local norms.4 ' However, this decentrali-
zation came at a price; vast discrepancies existed in case backlogs
among federal courts around the country, and there was no ready
mechanism to permit significant numbers of additional judges to be
42assigned to the recalcitrant districts.
As the twentieth century began, there was much criticism of
American courts, most notably manifested in the sweeping positivist
critique of the tenets of classical Langdellian jurisprudence and the
institution of strong judicial review.' Taft shared at least part of this
reform vision; he had no patience for classical categorical distinctions
or for complex procedural niceties. He urged a merging of the tradi-
tional forms of law and equity and a new ability for courts themselves
to draft simplified procedural rules." But Taft parted fundamentally
with the progressive reformers on the question of the proper role of
judicial authority-he saw robustjudicial review as a desirable conser-
45vative counterweight to progressive legislative excess.
Accordingly, Taft did not seek to minimize or limit judicial power,
but rather endeavored to save the courts from themselves and from
the more populist views of other reformers by strengthening the judi-
ciary. Although Taft acknowledged that the 'judges of our courts
have their faults," he felt that the problem was nothing inherent in
the institution ofjudicial review, but rather "with the legislative power
which does not provide them with adequate machinery for the
prompt and satisfactory dispatch of business." 46 Rather than discour-
aging federal judges from declaring law authoritatively, as some con-
temporaneous reformers sought to do, Taft instead sought to give
41 See ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. at 83 ("[A]I1 the said courts of the United States shall have
power ... to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the
said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States."); see, e.g.,
MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIc: KENTUCKY 1789-1816, at
179-83 (1978) (describing the Kentucky federal district court's judicial innovations to better
comport with local norms and attitudes).
42 See generally ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
43 For a comprehensive overview of populism and attitudes toward judicial power, see
WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND THE LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 49-69 .(1994).
4 William H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, KY. L.J., Nov. 1916, at 3, 14-16
(1916) [hereinafter Taft, Attacks on the Courts].
45 See, e.g., id. at 6 (declaring "judge-made law" to be "a part ofjurisprudence that can not be
dispensed with in any civilized government.").
46 William H. Taft, Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business, 7 A.B.A.J. 453, 453 (1921) [here-
inafter Taft, Adequate Machinery]; see also Post, supra note 33, at 312 (noting that Taft was "in the
paradoxical position of urging progressive reform of the judiciary so as to preempt what he
candidly term [ed] ... the growing progressive 'disposition to try experiments.'").
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them the administrative tools to do this more forcefully by introduc-
ing increased efficiency and organization to the federal judiciary."
Taft's program of judicial reform had many elements, but central
to it were two intersecting conceptual innovations that were impor-
tant precursors to the modern special appointment power of the
Chief Justice. Both were controversial at the time. They were: (1)
the notion that federal judges were not geographically fixed, but in-
stead were interchangeable, and could be moved from one court to
another without material impact on case outcomes; and (2) the idea
that the Chief Justice was the proper and exclusive repository to con-
trol such judicial resource allocation.8 Taft pushed for these reforms
in a series of speeches spanning the last two decades of his public ca-
reer.4 ' He proposed
the adjustment of our judicial force to the disposition of the increasing
business by introducing into the administration of justice the ordinary
business principles in successful executive work, of a head charged with
the responsibility of the use of the judicial force at places and under
conditions where the judicial force is needed.50
The Chief Justice, in Taft's view, was the natural executive head of
the judiciary, in charge of making "assignments... of the judicial
force to various districts and circuits, with a view to the most eco-
nomic use of each judge for the disposition of the greatest amount of
business by him."5' Elsewhere, Taft campaigned for "teamwork" and
the implementation of the "executive principle" in federal judicial
administration. 52 Taft, like Landis, Frankfurter and other judicial re-
formers of the day, admired the "elasticity" of the revamped British
system, the success of which he thought "rest[ed] on the executive
control vested in a council of judges to direct business and econo-
mize judicial force. 53 He also based some of his reforms on new state
and local judicial institutions like the Chicago Municipal Court,
whose chief judge acted administratively to allocate judges to cases as
docket demands arose.54
The most exemplary manifestation of this new conception of judi-
cial branch "elasticity"-too extreme for the Congress of the time
(and probably for today's Congress as well)-was a 1922 bill that
47 See generally Taft, Attacks on the Courts, supra note 44.
48 Id. at 16-17.
49 See Taft, Adequate Machinery, supra note 46, at 453 (advocating a pending bill which would
provide for additional district judges and for the introduction of the executive principle of as-
signment to places most needed); Taft, Attacks on the Courts, supra note 44, at 3 (recommending
judicial reform during a commencement address at Cincinnatti Law School).
50 Taft, Attacks on the Courts, supra note 44, at 16.
51 Id.
52 MASON, supra note 35, at 97.
53 Taft, Attacks on the Courts, supra note 44, at 13.
54 Id. at 17.
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would have established a set of at-large federal districtjudges, with no
home district, who could be sent from one place to another at the di-
rection of the ChiefJustice. This "flying squadron"" ofjudges would
have been subject to temporary assignment anywhere in the country
that the Chief Justice chose to send them. Taft concisely summarized
his vision for the bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1921:
"'The principle of this bill is the executive principle of having some
head to apply the judicial force at the strategic points where the ar-
rears have so increased that it needs a mass of judges to get rid of
them.' 56 Not surprisingly, the plan encountered heated opposition
in Congress because of the proposal's sharp break from the tradi-
tional conception of geographic fixity. Much of the criticism cen-
tered around the significant new authority the ChiefJustice would en-
joy. Senator Shields declared that the plan conjured up unsavory
images of "the Chief Justice as Commander in Chief,, 57 and criticized
Taft's reliance on contemporary English judicial organization, stat-
ing: "[T]he Lord High Chancellor of England, is both ajudicial and
political officer.... Are we not somewhat copying after the system in
England in creating a political as well as a judicial head of the Federal
Judiciary? 5 8 Shields concluded with a ringing defense of the tradi-
tional intra-branch independence of the lower federal court judges,
contending that the Chief Justice, who already held "as much power
as any officer in our government. .. has no more to do with the
judges of the district courts of the United States... than does King
George."59  Senator Overman added his opposition along similar
grounds, voicing concern about "eighteen roving judges to be sent
around at the will of the Chief Justice .... [I]t is fundamentally
wrong.
Senator Shields raised another concern relevant to the modern
special appointment power;6 specifically, that proponents of this
power must justify it, at least implicitly, by treating federal judges as
essentially interchangeable parts-similarly competent judges apply-
ing uniform federal laws in a reasonably mechanical and neutral fash-
ion. An alternative understanding-that federal judges are not fungi-
ble, that they have different ideologies that become manifest in
decisions-alters and expands the character of discretion that the
Chief exercises when making reassignment allocations. Today, the
fixed, and largely random, case assignment mechanisms of the fed-
5. 62 CONG. REC. 4858 (1922) (statement of Sen. Shields).
MASON, supra note 35, at 99.
57 62 CONG. REc. 4855.
58 Id. at 4853.
59 Id. at 4858.
ro Id. at 5098 (statement of Sen. Overman).
61 See infra Part I.B.
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eral circuit and district courts ameliorate much of the theoretical
concerns generated by the exercise of this discretion, but no such veil
of procedural randomness exists with respect to special subject mat-
ter courts.
For congressional opponents, the generalized court transfer au-
thority embodied in the at-large judges bill was problematic when
vested in the Chief Justice alone. Shields thought that the power to
assign judges provided the Chief with "political influence and power
over the judiciary of which a designing man could avail himself in
times of great political turmoil. 62 Shields also objected to Congress
"giving [away] this great and unlimited and dangerous power to the
Chief Justice. 65 Senator Thaddeus Caraway agreed that the proposal
gave the Chief too much unconstrained discretion; the bill was "per-
sonal government, so far as the ChiefJustice is concerned.
Many opponents thought the substantive content of this new dis-
cretion would be directed toward vigorous uniform enforcement of
the prohibition statutes. Noting that lobbyists for the Anti-Saloon
League were strongly in support of the legislation, Shields de-
nounced it as merely a scheme for "sending dry judges into wet terri-
tory., 65 Other opponents of the at-large judges bill raised objections
grounded in somewhat different conceptual concerns. Some
thought that the enhanced at-large appointment power, though a raw
increase in the Chief Justice's power, might ultimately undermine ju-
dicial stature. Representative Lea of California thought that "[w]e
should not endanger the prestige of our judges... by compelling
them to perform functions primarily legislative or political." Repre-
sentative Hayden thought that the departure from the traditional lo-
calist ideal undermined one minor public check on a generally unac-
countable federal judiciary. Said Hayden:
Almost the only restraining influence upon [federal judges] is that, by
reason of their selection from the bar of the State in which they continue
to reside, old friends can address them with frankness respecting their of-
ficial conduct. Judges with no fixed assignment would be without even
this slight check upon their actions ....
These three basic objections to the temporary appointment power
of the Chief Justice-(1) that it vests too much discretion in a single
judicial official; (2) that it generates an additional level of counterma-
662 CONG. REc. 4863 (statement of Sen. Shields).
63 Id. at 4853.
Id. at 4849 (statement of Sen. Caraway).
65 Id. at 4861-62 (statement of Sen. Shields). Another Southern Representative denounced
the plan as creating a class of"carpetbag judges." 62 CONG. REC. 204 (1921) (statement of Rep.
Stevenson).
Id. at 202 (statement of Rep. Lea).
67 Id. at 206-07 (statement of Rep. Hayden).
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joritarian difficulty; and (3) that it might actually undermine judicial
prestige by forcing the Chief Justice to make inherently political
choices-are still germane today, as explored in Part I.B. They are
expressed less and less in modern congressional debates, however,
even as, and probably because, the use of the power has become more
routine over the twentieth century. Although Taft lamented that his
suggestion of a "flying squadron of judges" did not meet with con-
gressional approval, the passage of a more limited transfer provision
furthered his ability to "'promote the strategic massing of the judicial
force of the country at the points of congestion."' 8 Other reforms,
like the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office statute,
would soon follow and promote the hierarchical bureaucratic model
that Taft favored for the federal judiciary. This across-the-board rise
in the Chief Justice's executive authority was a central feature of the
early twentieth-century reforms. Promoting the general acceptance
of the Chief Justice as the executive head of the judiciary established
an important historical and conceptual foundation for the special
court appointment power studied here.
B. The Power of Specific Appointment to Special Courts
It was also at Taft's behest, this time while President, that Con-
gress first debated, and briefly enacted, the first instance of the more
specific appointment power that is studied here-the special power
of the Chief Justice to appoint specific federal judges to a specific
court. This occured in connection with the ill-fated Commerce
Court, which although short-lived, established the initial statutory
precedent of a special court of limited jurisdiction whose judges were
selected by the Chief Justice to fixed terms from among the existing
federal judiciary. By mid-century, Congress appeared to have shed its
initial qualms about this particular structural innovation, and the
level of oppositional debate dropped as the appointment device was
used more frequently in statutes after 1940.
Two other features of the Commerce Court debate also appeared
to persist through the twentieth century, and both now have the ef-
fect of suppressing the breadth and depth of meaningful debate over
this type of authority-vesting in the Chief Justice. First, each recur-
rence of the Chief's special appointment power was in the context of
a new specialized court, so that policy debate focused more heavily on
the wisdom of the new courts themselves rather than the use of the
increasingly familiar means of staffing them. So, for instance, public
debate over the FISA Court or the Ethics in Government Act under-
MASON, supra note 35, at 106 (quoting a Nov. 28, 1923 letter from William H. Taft to H.M.
Daughtrey).
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standably centered on the substantive parts of those statutes that were
novel and controversial rather than on the relatively familiar ap-
pointment power of the Chief.69 Second, members of Congress have
avoided candidly discussing the fact that the Chief Justice might ex-
ercise substantive preferences via this delegation of power. Even the
occasional criticism of statutes proposing to vest appointment author-
ity in the Chief is typically cast in oblique terms about appearances of
impropriety rather than the potential for actual misuse. Rarely is
there a frank admission about judicial discretion of the sort embod-
ied in Senator Gore's speech quoted at the beginning of this Article."70
With these general explanations in mind, it is possible to move
rather quickly through the specific instances where Congress created
a special court staffed by temporary appointments by the Chief Jus-
tice in the twentieth century.
1. The Commerce Court (1910-1913)
At the urging of the Taft White House, Congress created the
Commerce Court in 1910 to hear appeals from orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission ("ICC"), which was itself charged with
regulating the nation's railroads.7" The new court had exclusive ju-
risdiction to enforce all orders of the ICC and to hear all challenges
to the Commission's rulings." Its inception exemplifies the rationale
behind many of the specialized courts in the federal system, includ-
ing, but not limited to, those courts whose judges are chosen by the
Chief Justice. With the advent and significant growth of the Ameri-
can administrative state, driven by a consensus that with modernism
"problems of law became problems of administration,"" there arose a
69 See, e.g., Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REv.
601, 608-32 (1998) (discussing the separation-of-powers concerns that occupied discussion of
various special prosecutor bills, including the fear that Congress and the judiciary were taking
power from the executive branch); KatyJ. Harringer, The History of the Independent Counsel Provi-
sions: How the Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 498-505 (1998) (addressing
the disagreement about whether the power to appoint independent counsel should be taken
away from the executive branch and given to the judiciary); see also Americo R. Cinquegrana,
The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 810 (1989) (noting that the elements of FISA that were
most hotly debated were the "standard for targeting Americans, [the] status of the President's
inherent authority," the role of the federal court, the treatment afforded aliens, and possible
warrantless surveillance of Americans overseas).
70 See source cited supra note 1.
71 Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539; see also George E. Dix,
The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238, 239
(1960).
72 §§ 1-2, 36 Stat. at 540-42.
73 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 35, at 146.
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need to create special technical tribunals to review the work of special
technical agencies. 4
More germane for present purposes, however, is the obvious fact
that each newly-minted specialized court requires judges to staff it,
which forces Congress to choose from among several available ap-
pointment devices. The simplest option, from the viewpoint of con-
stitutional precedent, is to create the new tribunal as a full-fledged
Article III court staffed with new life-tenured judges who are ap-
pointed via the normal nominate-and-consent process.75 Many special
courts are termed "legislative courts," in that technically they are situ-
ated outside of Article III. The judges on these courts do not enjoy
life tenure, but they nonetheless are usually appointed using the• • 76
standard two-stage process articulated in Article II. There are sev-
eral specialized judicial bodies that vest some appointment discretion
in groups of judges, such as the federal bankruptcy courts (whose
judges are chosen by the judges of the federal circuit court encom-
passing the bankruptcy district) 77 and the United States Sentencing
Commission (whose Article III judicial members are initially nomi-
nated by the Federal Judicial Conference). 7
The Commerce Court represented an early instance of Congress
facing these choices by creating a specialized tribunal, as well as the
first time Congress chose to transfer the appointment decision to the
Chief Justice. The particular Commerce Court statute involved a
compromise appointment device. The President nominated the ini-
tial five Commerce Court judges, who were then subject to senatorial
confirmation; these judges would serve no more than five years on
the special court.79 After this initial round of appointments, the Chief
Justice had the power to fill up subsequent vacancies on the Com-
74 There is a rich literature on the history, practice, and theory of these specialized courts;
an exegesis of the many issues of interest is well beyond the scope of this Article. For examples
of this large body of literature, see KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL SPECIAL COURT LITIGATION
(1990); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REv. 377 (1990); Rich-
ard R. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111
(1990).
75 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (allowing for the creation of courts by Congress, and allowing
for life tenure of judges); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to appoint
judges with the advice and consent of the Senate). The court that has evolved into the Federal
Circuit is one example of this model.
76 Id. art. II, § 2. A prominent example of a special court following this process is the Tax
Court.
77 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2004).
78 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a) (2004).
36 Stat. 539, 540 (1910). These initial judges were simultaneously appointed to an exist-
ing geographic circuit, where they would go with life tenure once their special court terms ex-
pired. Id.; see also Federal Judicial Center, Courts of the Federal Judiciary: Commerce Court
1910-1913 (detailing the history of the Commerce Court), at http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
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merce Court, and he was empowered to appoint existing federal cir-
cuitjudges to serve on the court for staggered five-year terms so
In both its jurisdictional scope and appointment mechanism, the
Commerce Court proposal was novel for its time; a contemporary po-
litical scientist called it "a tribunal unlike any other known to Ameri-
can law."'" This novelty produced a fair measure of opposition in
Congressional debates. Part of this debate centered on the question
of the Chief Justice's specific role in appointing judges, more robustly
so than would occur later in the century when Congress chose the
same selection device for other specialized tribunals. Opponents of
the vesting of appointment discretion in the Chief Justice raised con-
cerns similar to those detailed above in the context of the at-large
judges bill. Senator Robert LaFollette questioned the wisdom of vest-
ing so much discretion in a single officer, arguing that "[i]t seems to
me too important a matter to leave the designation of the members
of this court to one man, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States.",2 To restrain this individual discretion, LaFollette
proposed an amendment whereby appointment of the Commerce
Court judges "should be made by the entire membership of the Su-
preme Court instead of by a single member of that body."8 3 Senator
Gore concurred, criticizing the "overwrought sentimentality" of those
Senators who had opposed LaFollette's collective device on the
grounds that it unduly impugned the honor and integrity of the
Chief Justice.84 Gore explained that Americans "have, indeed, had a
long and illustrious line of Chief Justices," and "trust[ed] that line
[to] continue with undimmed and undiminished luster."8 5 But since
"[]udges are possessed... of the ordinary frailties that 'flesh is heir
to,"' Gore thought that Congress "should omit the erection of no
safeguard that contributes to the wise and just administration of the
law," and so should vest the appointment power in the Supreme
Court collectively.8 6 These opposing views were a minority, and the
new court was established in 1910. Although congressional critics of
the new appointment mechanism did not prevent the initial Com-
merce Court statute from passing, the new court had a short life.
Congress dissolved the tribunal three years later, before the Chief
Justice actually had the opportunity to exercise the appointment
power he possessed to select the second set of Commerce Court
80 36 Stat. at 540; see also James Wallace Bryan, The Railroad Bill and the Court of Commerce, 4
AM. POL. So. REV. 537, 537-38 (1910).
81 Id. at 537.
82 45 CONG. REC. 7347 (1910) (statement of Sen. LaFollette).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 7351 (statement of Sen. Gore).
85 Id.
86 Id.
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judges. This abolition of the tribunal resulted from congressional
displeasure concerning the Court's substantive decisions reviewing
ICC orders, and was unrelated to the appointment procedures used
to fill the seats. 1
The Commerce Court, although short-lived, provided an impor-
tant institutional device for filling special court seats that was applica-
ble to other tribunals in other subject areas. After Congress em-
ployed this mechanism in later decades for a few relatively non-
controversial special panels (described in the following pages), the
practice became well-established. More broadly, Taft's general judi-
cial reform program coincided with this initial grant of power to the
Chief Justice, and the other reforms greatly expanded a number of
other executive functions of the Chief Justice, including the power to
transfer judges from one general federal court to another. The in-
creasing prevalence and exercise of this general designation authority
likewise helped reassure later Congresses that the increasing use of
the special court appointment device was uncontroversial. As ex-
plained below, however, the choice underlying the act of transfer is
significantly more problematic when the Chief Justice knows exactly
what kind of legal matter the transferee judge will hear.
Viewed in mechanical terms, it was a small intellectual leap for
Congress to shift from a general comfort level with the Chief Justice's
basic reassignment to an acceptance of the special court appointment
device. With the traditional norms of geographic fixity and localism
eroded, Congress felt free to transfer this special power to the Chief
Justice on multiple occasions as the century progressed. The follow-
ing few pages summarize these specific special courts in chronologi-
cal order.
2. Emergency Court of Appeals (1942-1961)
During World War II, Congress implemented national wage and
price controls through passage of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, and created a specialized agency, the Office of Price Admini-
stration ("OPA"), to promulgate and apply implementing regula-
tions.88 The OPA was a centralized, specialized entity, and Congress
concurrently created a centralized, specialized mode of reviewing its
actions: the Emergency Court of Appeals ("ECA"). s9 The ECA had
87 For a careful analysis of the legal rulings of the Commerce Court and its treatment by the
United States Supreme Court, see Samuel 0. Dunn, The Commerce Court Question, 3 AM. ECON.
REV. 20 (1913).
88 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
'9 § 204(c), 56 Stat. at 32 ('There is hereby created... the Emergency Court of Ap-
peals .... ."); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 74, at 393-94 (surveying briefly the creation of the
Emergency Court of Appeals).
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exclusive jurisdiction to "determine the validity of any regulation or
order issued under [the Act], of any price schedule effective in ac-
cordance with [the Act], and of any provision of any such regulation,
order, or price schedule." 90 Its authority was narrow, as it was statuto-
rily required to review the OPA's decisions under an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard; it was constrained in its review of the record,
and it had no power to enjoin or stay OPA regulations.9
Congress provided the ECA with judges by reviving the part-time
model vesting authority in the Chief Justice that it had enacted in the
earlier Commerce Court statute. The Chief Justice was given the
power to choose three existing federal judges to serve as temporary
appointments on ECA while still sitting part-time on their home
courts. 9 The ECA had significant business during the war, and by
1945, five circuit judges heard cases nearly full-time.93 Congress ex-
tended the court's special jurisdiction over related matters for more
than a decade after the war's end, and it was generally considered "a
successful innovation" by "most observers" in law practice and the le-
gal academy.94 Most significantly for the purposes of this Article, Con-
gress would replicate the ECA's basic Chief Justice-centered ap-
pointment provision in the decades ahead, making it "the template
upon which several subsequent courts were modeled."9
3. Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (1971-1992)
The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ("TECA") was one
replication of the ECA model in jurisdictional scope as well as ap-
pointment device.96 Like the ECA, the TECA's jurisdiction was exclu-
sive and initially focused on appeals arising from implementation of
the wage and price control program embodied in the Economic Sta-
bilization Act of 1970. 97 TECA was more like a regular federal circuit
court, however, in that it reviewed decisions of the federal district
courts instead of a specialized agency."' TECA survived for twenty-
one years because Congress added other specialized statutes (typically
in the energy area) to its exclusive jurisdiction after the initial price
90 § 204(d).
91 Dreyfuss, supra note 74, at 394.
92 § 204.
93 Dreyfuss, supra note 74, at 395.
94 Id. at 396.
95 Id.
96 See Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971).
97 Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 796, 799-800 (1970) (authorizing the President to
stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries to prevent inequalities).
98 85 Stat. 743.
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control act expired9m TECA's appointment provision fit the basic
model discussed here: the Chief Justice chose existing Article III
judges to fill the requisite number of spots.
4. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (1 968-present)
In response to increasing instances of similar litigation arising re-
peatedly in different districts, Congress in 1968 centralized and for-
malized an institutional structure that had been developing for sev-
eral years within Article III under the leadership of the Federal
Judicial Conference. The enabling statute created the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation ('JPMDL"), a panel of seven federal dis-
trict or circuit judges with sweeping procedural authority over the
consolidation, coordination, and transfer of civil cases involving
common questions of fact.00 The JPMDL was empowered with sig-
nificant authority to shape the procedural resolution of import.
More than any other specialized tribunal, its impetus came from the
judiciary itself; judges (of the Federal Judicial Conference) drafted
the bill "to refine and regularize a system of consolidated pretrial
proceedings for the more troublesome instances of multiple litiga-
tion."' O' Congress introduced and passed the bill as essentially "iden-
tical to the proposal of the [FJC's] Coordinating Committee.'0 2 The
Chief Justice chose the seven members of the JPMDL, who had to
come from seven different circuits, from among existing circuit
judges.'
5. The Special Division of the D. C. Circuit (1978-2000)
The ECA, TECA, and JPMDL exercise judicial power in special-
ized areas that are relatively narrow, technical, and procedural. The
ECA and TECA courts apply a highly technical rule scheme, and the
JPMDL's role is primarily one of oversight and consolidation. Later
in this Article, I discuss a problematic feature of the Chief Justice's
appointment authority-the potential that the Chief Justice could
99 See generallyJames R. Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdica-
tion of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DuKE L.J. 113 (1978) (describing the history and practice of
TECA).
100 Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407); see
Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 34-35 (1991) (discussing
the composition of the panel and the process by which cases are heard and decided); see also
Stephen B. Burbank, Case Five: Complex Litigation and Prior Rulings Issues, Conference on Jurisdic-
tion, Justice, and Choice of Law for the Twenty-first Century, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 724 (1995) (discuss-
ing the law and practice of pretrial transfer by federal courts).
101 112 CONG. REc. 22,146 (1966) (statement of Sen. Tydings).
102 Id.
"0 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
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strategically select judges. But if there is a general concern about ju-
dicial preferences being manifested through the particular acts of
special tribunals, it is perhaps muted in the context of a body that
hears relatively technical matters with little ideological undercurrent.
If this is so, then perhaps the Chief Justice's appointment authority
over these first three tribunals is little cause for alarm.
In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, and with widespread
distrust of presidential authority persisting, the 1970s produced a very
different kind of special judicial body, created in part with the ex-
press purpose of checking executive power. The basic structure of
the Ethics in Government Act,10 4 which instituted and governed the
selection of independent counsel, is well known. So too is the man-
ner in which the operation of this statutory scheme led to several
high profile and politically charged investigations, most notably Ken-
neth Starr's inquiry into President Clinton's conduct that culminated
in an impeachment trial in 1998.10 The Act vested two different ap-
pointment powers in the judiciary; the most hotly debated has been
the second-the power of the three judges on the Special Division of
the District of Columbia Circuit to select independent counsels and
to define the scope of the counsels' investigations. 06 But the statute
also gave the Chief Justice the antecedent authority to pick the three
specific judges who would, in turn, pick the independent counsel. 7
As I will discuss in the last section of this Article, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's selection of allegedly conservative judges to form a ma-
jority of this panel was much noted and criticized during the Starr in-
vestigation.10
6. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
and Court of Review (1978--present)
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA") 09 in response to allegations of executive branch mis-
conduct in intelligence gatherings that were contained in the
104 See Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 602(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 49,591-99 (1994)).
105 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 2-3 (noting the impact of the Clinton investi-
gation on the public debate surrounding the office of independent counsel).
106 28 U.S.C. § 593(b), (c) (1994) (rendered ineffective in 1999 by operation of§ 599).
107 28 U.S.C. § 49(a), (d) (2004).
108 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that a "conservative Chief Justice, such
as William Rehnquist, is perceived as likely to select conservative judges" and that "[ t] he selec-
tion of Kenneth Starr as Whitewater independent counsel indicates this danger.").
109 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-11, 2518-19 (2003)).
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"Church Report" issued in 1975, "0 as well as a Supreme Court opin-
ion suggesting that the Fourth Amendment might require some prior
judicial warrant in certain types of national security related investiga-
tions."' FISA created a new specialized federal district court, housed
in a special secure chamber within the Department of Justice and
closed to the public.11 2 The FISA Court reviews Department ofJustice
applications for warrants related to national security investigations.
Initially comprised of seven judges, Congress recently responded to
increased counterterrorism enforcement activity by expanding the
FISA Court to eleven judges who serve staggered, non-renewable
terms of no more than seven years."1 The Chief Justice selects the
FISA Court judges from existing federal district courtjudges. 1 4 If the
government's warrant application is denied, a circumstance that has
happened exactly once in twenty-five years," 5 it can appeal to a special
FISA Court of Review, comyrised of three federal circuit judges se-
lected by the ChiefJustice.
As with the Chief Justice's appointment power relative to the in-
dependent counsel structure, this specific power generated only a
small amount of debate. By 1978, the power had been used so often
that historical practice served as a persuasive justification for its use.
Robert Kastenmeier, the sponsor of FISA in the House, expressly in-
voked this history in justifying the appointment device, noting that
the Chief Justice's FISA Court appointment power was supported by
"the example of" the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals; he
contended that TECA provided "ample precedent for such a special
10 STAFF OF S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973
(Comm. Print 1975) (identifying the need for "procedures for insuring that covert actions are
and remain accountable both to the senior political and foreign policy officials of the Executive
Branch and to Congress."), available at http://www.foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp
(last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
I See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 319 (1972) (discussing the "conver-
gence of First and Fourth Amendment values" in national security cases and requiring "an ap-
propriate warrant procedure" for electronic surveillance in domestic security matters).
11 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (c) (2004) (discussing the security measures for the record of the
proceedings); see also Cinquegrana, supra note 69, at 812 ("[T] he government presents applica-
tions for warrants to the [FISA Court] judges in in camera, ex parte proceedings conducted un-
der physical security measures designed to protect sensitive national security information.").
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (amended and codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (d) (2003)).
114 § 1803(a).
115 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting that the
case was "the first appeal from the Federal Surveillance Court to the Court of Review since the
passage of [FISA] in 1978.").
16 See § 1803(b) (directing the ChiefJustice to appoint three judges to review denials of elec-
tronic surveillance applications).
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court."' 7 One committee of Congress did express concern over the
Chief Justice exercising purely individual discretion, noting in pass-
ing that "the conferees expect that the Chief Justice will consult with
the chief judges of the judicial circuits in making designations of
judges under this section."""
The importance of the FISA Court and the FISA Court of Review
have only increased with the advent of the post-September 11 "war on
terror." In a legal world where the Supreme Court has recently
stressed the important supervisory role that courts are to play in me-
diating the balance between civil liberties and national security in
times of war," 9 the FISA's exclusive role in reviewing government sur-
veillance requests will continue to be critical.
To sum up the foregoing historical story, it appears that only a few
generations after Taft's proposals were robustly criticized, sometimes
on expressly constitutional grounds, members of Congress came to
regard the Chief Justice's appointment authority within the judicial
branch as relatively unexceptional. To be sure,judicial authority over
interbranch appointments remained (and remains) controversial, as
the Special Division's role in selecting an independent prosecutor
demonstrates. But with regard to transferring existing judges from
one court to another, and a host of other administrative and bureau-
cratic powers, Taft's vision of a federal judiciary imbued with the "ex-
ecutive principle," and managed by the Chief as the "head," has been
realized.
II. CONSIDERATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND THEORY
Under current doctrine, the Chief Justice's appointment power
appears safe from a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality. Al-
though early twentieth-century Congresses expressed significant
doubts about the wisdom of the Chief Justice's appointment power,
by mid-century and beyond, Congress became more and more com-
fortable with the power and considered its conceptual implications
less and less. Meanwhile, Supreme Court rulings over this long pe-
riod emboldened Congress. Although the Supreme Court has never
17 124 CONG. REC. 28172 (1978) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
1S H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1720, at 27 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4056.
119 See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2692-99 (2004) (holding that United States courts have
jurisdiction to consider the legality of detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and held
at Guantdnamo Bay); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646-50 (2004) (emphasizing the
due process rights of citizens detained in the war on terror and declaring that "a state of war is
not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.").
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squarely considered and upheld the constitutionality of the special
court appointment power of the Chief Justice, it has implicitly done
so by upholding several of the special courts themselves. 20 In addi-
tion, it has rejected challenges to very similar powers held by the
Chief Justice, such as the power to temporarily transfer judges from
one general federal court to another. 21 With these and other prece-
dents, together with the established history and some textual support
from the Appointments Clause, it is not hard to build a convincing
case for doctrinal constitutionality.
However, not all constitutionally permissible legislative choices are
equally consistent with the Constitution's basic allocation of author-
ity, and with the theoretical grounds that justify the Constitution's
structure. The special court appointment power vests the Chief Jus-
tice with meaningful discretion to select specific judges to sit on spe-
cific kinds of courts-a kind of decisional authority that is rarely, and
uncomfortably, vested in a single unelected official. This Part exam-
ines this conceptual difficulty in greater detail, and proceeds in three
distinct parts. Part II.A tracks the basic doctrinal constitutionality of
the Chief's special court appointment authority, and sets forth the
relatively convincing arguments that this is almost certainly, in the
conventional doctrinal sense, a "constitutional" policy choice by Con-
gress. Part II.B is a deeper exploration of some of the troubling fea-
tures of such a power from the perspective of theories of judicial au-
thority. Part II.C explores alternatives that Congress might use if it
wishes to staff future special courts by mechanisms other than Article
II's nominate-and-consent framework, which would avoid vesting un-
constrained authority in the ChiefJustice alone.
A. The Doctrinal Case for Constitutionality
The Supreme Court has never expressly considered and affirmed
the constitutionality of the special court appointment authority at is-
sue here. But it has implicitly done so, by upholding the Emergency
Court of Appeals and the independent counsel system established by
the Ethics in Government Act.'"2 It has also upheld other very similar
120 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (holding that it was constitutionally
permissible "for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Divi-
sion"); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) (validating the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act's conferral of exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of price control regula-
tions to the United States Emergency Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court).
121 SeeLamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 118 (1916) (suggesting that the mere contention
that the transfer ofjudges between federal courts violated the Constitution "suffices to demon-
strate its absolute unsoundness.").
1 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696 (affirming the constitutionality of the independent counsel
provision of the Ethics in Government Act).
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powers of the Chief Justice, such as the temporary appointment
power from one general federal court to another.1 2 ' The basic case
for constitutionality entails these and other well-supported elements.
First, the act of appointing a judge to fulfill special duties on a
special court is unquestionably "executive" in form, but it is the kind
of executive action that American judges have performed throughout
history, although to a more limited degree than the Chief Justice now
does. Even the earliest federal judges appointed clerks and marshals,
and for the past century the Chief Justice and the chief judges of the
circuits have regularly exercised administrative authority to shift exist-
ing judges from one court to another for a temporary designation.
Since the Taft reforms of the 1920s, this reassignment power has
been exercised more and more frequently as described earlier.
Second, the text of Article II's Appointments Clause is also help-
ful, at least at a certain level of generality and perhaps as a more spe-
cific authorization as well. At the very least, the clause's statement
that Congress may "vest the Appointment of... inferior Offi-
cers ... in the Courts of Law"'12 4 confirms two general propositions:
(1) Congress has some latitude to structure alternative methods of
making appointments, and (2) it may vest meaningful authority in
the judiciary for this purpose. Despite the Constitution's baseline
premise of bifurcated President-Senate participation, other means of
appointment are possible in appropriate cases, and the fact that the
Chief's special court appointment authority is novel does not render
it automatically invalid. The text gets most of the way to a case for
constitutionality, but strict reliance on the words presents two linguis-
tic hurdles due to the clause's two limitations on vesting this power in
the judiciary. First, Article II says that Congress may transfer the
power to "courts of law," but is silent as to transfer to individual
judges, raising doubts about whether the Chief Justice alone can ex-
ercise it. 12 Second, and more problematic, the ability to structure al-
ternative appointment arrangements hinges on the classification of
appointees as "inferior officers," and it is unlikely that lower federal
court judges would fit this definition.
History and recent precedent suggest that the "courts of law"
phraseology is probably no limitation at all. In early practice this was
a distinction without a difference because nineteenth-century district
court judges had the power to appoint clerks and commissioners, but
most federal districts were staffed by a single judge, who essentially
was "the court." That this fact of life eroded with the passage of time
12 See Lamar, 241 U.S. at 118 (upholding the ChiefJustice's temporary appointment power).
124 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
25 Id. ("Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper... in the Courts of Law.. ").
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did not change the practice. The Supreme Court has never been
troubled by the precise reading of the text, even where appointment
discretion is placed solely with the chief judge of a multimember
court. A decade ago, in its decision in Freytag v. Commisioner of Internal
Revenue,12 6 the Court considered the question of whether Congress
could vest the chief judge of the Tax Court, a non-Article III tribunal,
with authority to appoint commissioners who would assist in the ad-
judication of cases." The hard question for the Justices in that case
was whether the Tax Court qualified as a "court of law," but once a
majorit of the Supreme Court answered that question affirma-
tively,12 it had no trouble with (and did not analyze) the fact that the
appointment authority was vested solely in the chief judge of the Tax
Court rather than the entire group ofjudges.
More troubling is the "inferior officer" limitation: do lower fed-
eral judges qualify as inferior officers? At one time in recent history,
it was possible to so argue; Professor Burke Shartel did just that in a
carefully reasoned article that appeared in the Michigan Law Review
in 19 30 .'2 Outside of law journals, however, no serious claim has
been recently made by Congress, the President, or the Supreme
Court that federal district or circuit judges are "inferior officers" who
could be appointed in any way other than the nominate-and-consent
framework. Just this year the Department of Justice rejected such an
argument as it appeared in a Supreme Court brief, claiming that Ar-
ticle III judges must be appointed as "principal officers" in the nor-
mal Article II frame. 30
For this reason, the constitutional text cannot do all of the work
by itself, although it does support the more general idea of a range of
policy alternatives in appointment mechanisms. In this regard, the
fact that this is a device that Congress has employed throughout the
125 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
127 Id. at 873 (noting the "important questions the litigation raises").
128 Id. at 892 ("Including... the Tax Court... among the 'Courts of Law' does not signifi-
cantly expand the universe of actors eligible to receive the appointment power."). Justice Scalia
took a different path to the same result. He disputed that the Tax Court was a "court of law," a
term he found limited to Article III tribunals, but instead thought it qualified as a "Department"
and the chiefjudge as "Head" could exercise appointment powers. Id. at 922 (Scalia,J., dissent-
ing) ("[C]onsidering the ChiefJudge of the Tax Court to be the head of a department seems to
me the only reasonable construction of Article II, § 2."). Standard principles of avoiding re-
dundancy in textual interpretation would suggest that Scalia's argument would not work as a
textual justification of the Chief Justice's appointment authority. Since the Supreme Court is
unquestionably a "court of law," it would not also be considered a "Department."
1 See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities
Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REv. 485, 514 (1930) (suggesting that the appointment of
inferior judges should be done by the judicial branch itself).
1o See Brief for the United States at 32-35, Nguyen v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003)
(Nos. 01-10873 & 02-5034), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/3mer/2mer/
2001-10873.mer.aa.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
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twentieth century supports its constitutionality. The limitation of the
Chief Justice's appointment discretion to the existing pool of federal
judges matters for this kind of doctrinal acceptance, even if, as a
functional matter, this limitation leaves vast discretion to choose
among widely divergent viewpoints. An exemplar of this reasoning is
then-Judge Anthony Kennedy's Ninth Circuit opinion in the case of
United States v. Cavanagh,'-" which upheld the FISA Court's appoint-
ment procedures against constitutional challenge by stressing the
long-standing power of the Chief Justice to reassign existing Article
IIIjudges to other courts within the federal system."
Finally, viewed in light of the long history of the ChiefJustice's au-
thority to reallocate the federal judicial force, this kind of special
court appointment power looks much more familiar, and therefore
much less controversial, than other novel arrangements that the
Court has explicitly upheld. For instance, in the independent coun-
sel structure, the most dubious appointment device was the authority
of the Special Division to make an interbranch appointment of inde-
pendent counsel. 3 Next to this controversial innovation, the Chief
Justice's intrabranch designation of existing federal judges to staff the
Special Division looks comfortably familiar, and it is hard to imagine
a Court that upheld the former device is seriously questioning the lat-
ter.13 4  Similarly, the Supreme Court upheld the unusual selection
mechanism for the United States Sentencing Commission,"5 which
vests responsibility for selection of the judicial members of that body
in three different places sequentially: the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence, the President, and the Senate. 's' I argue below that this sequen-
tial multibranch appointment process is better policy than vesting
sole discretion in a single judicial official, but it is undoubtedly more
unusual as a matter of constitutional structure, and was upheld by a
large majority of the Court.
1 37
1 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987).
132 Id. at 792.
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1994) (rendered ineffective in 1999 by operation of § 599) (au-
thorizing the Special Division to appoint independent counsel at the request of the Attorney
General); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 707 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring
with disapproval to the Special Division's authority "to determine the scope and duration of the
[independent counsel's] investigation.").
134 See supra text accompanying note 120; Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (upholding the independent
counsel provision).
135 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the structure and author-
ity of the United States Sentencing Commission).
156 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2004).
137 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 389 (8-1 decision) ("[A] lthough the judicial power of the United
States is limited by express provision of Article III to 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' we have never
held.., that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary bodies
within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties that... are 'necessary and
proper [to executing judicial holdings].'") (citation omitted).
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Just as the Chiefs appointment power has been held to work no
impermissible incursion on the President's Article I authority, so too
does it uphold the constitutional independence of individual federal
judges selected to fill the special spots. Early twentieth-century critics
of judicial mobility made this sort of argument, claiming that Article
III guaranteed judges a specific geographic locale, and moreover,
formed a sort of "contract" with the public that the judge would oc-
cupy that-and only that-seat.'- Such an argument is not tenable
today, given the widespread judicial mobility that has existed for over
half a century.
B. Problematic Features of the Power
As the foregoing account explains, the special court appointment
power of the Chief Justice is a type of authority that American courts
have not declared to be unconstitutional, and will not declare uncon-
stitutional in the foreseeable future. It is an appointment mechanism
that Congress can safely use in the design of new specialized courts,
and it is a device that Congress has used with increasing frequency
over the past several decades. The question, then, becomes whether
Congress should do so-or, to put it differently, whether the practice
does sufficient violence to basic constitutional norms that Congress
should look hard for alternative devices that are less problematic. In
this section, I contend that there are significant theoretical problems
with vesting the Chief Justice with sole authority to place particular
judges on particular kinds of cases, and that Congress should dele-
gate such authority sparingly, if at all. I explore these difficulties in
further detail below; most stem from the basic starting point that the
power to choose judges for special courts contravenes several express
and implicit norms that are fundamental to the architecture and ap-
plication of Article III power.
First, at the most obvious level of textual expression, the Constitu-
"tion normally vests the appointment of federal judges in the political
branches."'5 The Chief Justice's special court designation authority is
an appointment power-even if limited in time and to existing fed-
eral judges-and is exercised without the salutary features of democ-
I-M See Bryan, supra note 80, at 543 ("This proposition, if pushed to its logical conclusion,
would seem to identify the 'powers and duties' of a circuit judge with his 'office.'").
1s9 The Constitution provides:
[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States... but Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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ratic accountability and discourse that normally accompany the selec-
tion of federal judges. Second, and more subtly, the Chief Justice's
sole appointment power for these special courts runs counter to sev-
eral customary norms that typically constrain the exercise of Article
III power. It entails an exercise of discretion that is both meaningful,
in that it can potentially affect substantive outcomes, and inherently
political, in that it is unconstrained by any of the factors-such as ap-
plication of doctrine or text, or the norms of reason-giving-that may
operate to constrain judicial discretion in the adjudicative function.
Moreover, adjudication in the federal judiciary is a collective act, with
individual judges' decisions subject either to review by a higher court,
or to the collective voting dynamics of a multimember court, or both.
The ChiefJustice's appointment power departs dramatically from this
collective action norm, and is unchecked by any other federal judge.
Finally, the ability to match a specific judge with a specific subject
matter case also deviates from the normal, more mechanical (if not
completely random), assignment process whereby federal judges are
assigned to cases. It is not the kind of power that can be comfortably
vested in a single life-tenured judge without placing a strain on these
basic Article III norms.
To speak of the wrong "kind" of power in the separation of powers
context can suggest a formal categorical analysis, but my claim here is
not of that sort. The problem is not that the Chief Justice's act of ap-
pointing a special court judge is executive in nature, although it un-
questionably is. This is the type of executive act that American judges
have exercised almost from the beginning, and is expressly contem-
plated in the text of Article II's Appointments Clause. The concern
is not with the character of the act itself but in the nature of the sub-
stantive choice that precedes it: the selection of which judge among
hundreds will sit on a given special court. Because the choice is made
with foreknowledge that the appointee will rule on a particular kind
of matter, it is a more meaningful exercise of discretion than that
which accompanies other judicial appointment acts that look superfi-
cially much the same (such as that of choosing a clerk or marshall, or
transferring a judge from one generalist court to another where case
assignments are random). Of course, federal judges exercise mean-
ingful discretion all the time in their regular adjudicative role, how-
ever these jurisprudential choices are distinguishable for good rea-
sons, which will be explored below. Conversely, the appointment
choice is generally not the kind of decision that the Constitution pre-
sumptively allocates to a single unelected judge-particularly where,
as here, the choice is freighted with the potential to affect specific
140 Id.
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outcomes. It is, both in its nature and in terms of its conceptual
placement within the constitutional structure, a fundamentally politi-
cal choice inappropriately allocated to a single judicial official.
1. Incongruity with Original Allocative Choices
As a matter of relatively plain constitutional text, the Chief Jus-
tice's designation authority departs fairly obviously from the pre-
sumptive mechanism for placing federal judges in judicial seats. For
reasons stated above, the Appointments Clause permits alternative-
perhaps even quite innovative-arrangements for selecting federal
officials, and it is by no means clear that this mechanism represents a
doctrinally impermissible choice. But the Chief's authority does run
counter to the fundamental assumptions underlying the Appoint-
ments Clause. The Framers, recognizing that the appointment of
judges was an act that entailed the exercise of political discretion
rather than legal judgment, vested that choice in branches of gov-
ernment that were at least indirectly responsible to the public.
The Appointments Clause follows two different premises, both of
which are undermined when the power to fill special court seats is
delegated to the ChiefJustice. First, by allocating the appointment of
federal judges to elected officials, the Framers ensured that those
who selected judges "were accountable to political force and the will
of the people."' This up-front political influence is an important
feature of an American judiciary that is otherwise immune from
popular accountability. Accordingly, it was important to the Framers
that the nomination choice be placed with the President, who was
"answerable" for the selections he made. 4 2
Second, the Appointments Clause goes further than this, evincing
an unwillingness to vest the power in one branch of government,
much less one individual. As the Supreme Court has explained, the
Appointments Clause "bespeaks a principle of limitation by dividing
the power to appoint the principal federal officers-ambassadors,
ministers, heads of departments, and judges--between the Executive
and Legislative branches."'43 The Framers regarded the Senate's po-
141 Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991) (holding that a special
trial judge is an "inferior officer" and that the Tax Court is a "court of law" within the meaning
of the Appointments Clause).
142 NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BYJAMES MADISON
316 (Ohio University Press 1966) (1920) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES] ("The Executive
would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one
would fall on him alone."). For general discussion of the historical debates over the Appoint-
ments Clause, see MICHAELJ. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 17-44 (2000),
and William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 55-58 (1990).
145 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added).
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tential veto as an important constraint on executive discretion, "an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the Presi-
dent.... tend[ing] greatly to [prevent] the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from per-
sonal attachment, or from a view to popularity."'"4 As Gouverneur
Morris described the operation of this sequential structure, as "the
President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the
Senate was to concur, there would be security."' 5
As expressed by the Framers, the baseline two-step appointment
process was grounded primarily in conceptual concerns of legitimacy,
placing the choice with elected officials, and collectivity bifurcating
the approval between the President and the Senate. The Chief Jus-
tice's appointment activity contravenes both ideals because it is both
unilateral and unaccountable. Moreover, whether or not contem-
plated by the Framers, there is a discourse-generating feature of the
bifurcated appointment process that is also missing in the exercise of
the Chief Justice's power. Judicial nominations generate significant
discussion in the Senate and the broader public about what kind of
judges-and indirectly, what kind of judicial decisions-the nation
desires. The extent and quality of such discourse is occasionally criti-
cized, but few have suggested eliminating the discussion about nomi-
nees altogether, and there are many ways in which such discussion is
a public good.
The Chief Justice's appointment power presents the opposite
problem. Despite the national importance of courts such as FISA or
the former D.C. Circuit Special Panel, there is no ex ante public dis-
cussion of specific possible candidates or even what general views and
attributes we would want these special court judges to possess. The
silence goes beyond this, for there is likewise no rationale by the
Chief Justice, even after the fact, to justify his appointment choices;
additionally, there is no clear centralized public list that records the
special appointments made by the office of Chief Justice. 45 This
problem, although initially derived from the removal of the ap-
pointment decision from the Article II framework, is a separate issue
that could be remedied independently. As I discuss below, Congress
could devise a regime whereby the Chief Justice or a group of judges
retain some special court appointment authority, but make those
choices in a more transparent fashion, or the Chief Justice could do
so voluntarily.
144 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
145 NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 142, at 598.
14 A significant component of the research for this Article was the collection of data, from
multiple sources, to compile the unified listing of Burger and Rehnquist special court appoint-
ments in Appendix A. See app. A. infra pp. 397-402.
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2. Incongruity with Internal Article III Norms
The normal operation of the Appointments Clause represents an
allocative choice between different branches of government. Recog-
nizing the fact that life-tenured judges are, by design, relatively inde-
pendent from public opinion, the Constitution vests the basic ap-
pointment choice outside of Article III, thus ameliorating the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" in an important way. This inter-
branch collaboration is well-studied and clearly expressed in the Con-
stitution's text, and for the reasons stated above, the Chief Justice's
appointment power sits in uneasy tension with that basic allocative
choice. Unlike the Appointments Clause, the norms discussed in this
subsection are not explicit in the constitutional text. However they
are sufficiently well established to be considered fundamental build-
ing blocks of federal judicial power. In turn, they are: (1) the norm
of reason-giving accompanying the exercise ofjudicial power; (2) the
norm of collective action within Article III; and (3) the norm against
strategic matching of particular judges with particular cases. In the
ways I describe below, the Chief Justice's appointment authority is in-
consistent with all three of these basic Article III norms.
a. The Norm of Reason-Giving
One justification for the immense power federal judges hold is
that the judges are obligated to record and articulate reasons for the
meaningful actions they make. This norm is not expressly stated
anywhere in Article III, but it has been a component of adjudication
for much longer than the Constitution itself has existed. By virtue of
giving written reasons for their actions, judges' discretion is arguably
constrained-both by the bounds of precedent and logic and also by
a requirement of consistency with their own previously expressed
statements. Written judicial reasoning also facilitates broader dis-
course among academics, other judges, and the public about the par-
ticular choices judges make in ways that may produce better specific
results, and, more generally, a more robust civic dialogue. Owen Fiss
has described this aspect of the judicial office as a 'judge's obligation
to participate in a dialogue" and "to speak back" to the public at large
with well-stated explanations that transcend the judge's personal be-liefs • 47
liefs and attitudes. Measured against this background norm, the
Chief Justice's special court appointment power is highly anomalous;
the Chief Justice does not justify or explain his appointment choices
by giving any contemporaneous reasoning about the chosen judges.
147 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979).
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Public discourse, if it occurs at all, happens long after the Chief Jus-
tice makes the appointment choices.
This discursive void arises more from the essential character of the
choice Congress has vested in the Chief Justice than from any specific
disinclination by the Chief Justice to promulgate reasons. The ap-
pointment choice is not effectively channeled by any of the tools that
judges normally use to constrain their individual preferences in the
course of adjudication. Nothing in the normal judicial tool kit for
deciding cases-text, precedent, original history, and common law
reasoning, to name a few possibilities-provides any basis upon which
to select one federal judge of reasonable competence over another to
sit on a given specialized court. Even if the Chief Justice were to
clearly articulate the underlying reasons behind a particular ap-
pointment choice, they would not be the kind of reasons that we
would accept to justify ajudicial ruling.48 The appointment authority
of the Chief Justice is, as the In re Hennen argument quoted earlier
aptly describes, a "merely naked power" shorn ofjudicial rationale. 49
The discretion that the Chief Justice exercises is thus uncon-
strained by any recognizable rules of decision. Such executive discre-
tion is not necessarily atypical in the modern judiciary; the Chief Jus-
tice also has significant authority in many other matters of federal
judicial administration, such as the hiring of court personnel, the
scheduling of court business, or the leadership of the Federal Judicial
Conference. 5 0 Standardless discretion is only problematic in the ju-
dicial context if its exercise is meaningful relative to results-that is, if
the appointment power that the Chief Justice possesses can poten-
tially be exercised in a way that could skew the outcomes of the spe-
cial tribunals. I assert that the Chief Justice's appointment power is
potentially significant in this way. This claim that the choice of spe-
cial courtjudges can affect case outcomes rests on several separate as-
sumptions (all fairly well accepted), and it is worth spelling out these
assumptions in the context of the special court appointment situa-
tion. All must be present for the Chief Justice to strategically mani-
fest his policy preferences into possible outcomes of the special
courts.
First, for the Chief Justice's appointment discretion to materially
affect results, federal judges must be diverse in terms of their ideolo-
148 SeeJohn A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciaiy: Institution-
alizingJudicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1037-39 (2002) (arguing that it may not be desir-
able to exert outside influence on the judicial branch because the judiciary has been effective at
implementing institutional and doctrinal devices of self-restraint).
149 In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 235-36 (1839) (argument of petitioner).
150 See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 12, at 224-25 (discussing the Rehnquist
Court's and the Judicial Conference's relationships with Congress in creating new federal
rights).
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gies, legal philosophies, and/or technical competence. 151 The Chief
Justice's special court appointment power is limited to existing fed-
eral judges, a limit that has been important to courts in upholding its
constitutional validity. 52 If federal judges are truly fungible, then the
Chief Justice's discretion is essentially meaningless with regard to
special court decision making-federal judges would be expected to
be identical in terms of their judicial behavior. To state such a
proposition is virtually to refute it, for the federal bench is obviously
diverse in terms ofjudges' individual ideologies. The extent to which
such judicial preferences impact case outcomes is a different and
harder question that I address below, but the fact that such diversity
exists is indisputable. Revealing in this regard is the dynamic that oc-
curs when the President nominates an existing district judge to fill a
circuit court seat. The Senate does not automatically acquiesce in
every case on the theory that federal judges are alike and fungible,
nor does it confine its inquiry to technical competence. Rather, it of-
ten probes the nominee's specific philosophies, in recognition of the
fact that not all federal judges think alike.
Another necessary predicate for the Chief Justice's ability to po-
tentially affect results is that the different preferences judges possess
affect special court outcomes at least some of the time. Mere judicial
heterogeneity would be little cause for concern if those differences
were never manifested in case outcomes. There is a significant
amount of work in law and political science that suggests that judicial
preferences do matter at least in some cases; even those who con-
tend that neutral rules constrain judicial decision making most of the
time concede that there are hard, or ambiguous cases, where judges
necessarily draw on extralegal considerations that might track with
151 Obviously, it matters on which of these scales judges differ. A federal bench that is diverse
only in terms of technical competence presents different kinds of appointment choices for the
Chief Justice than one that is also, or alternatively, diverse along observable ideological lines.
The claim here, and more specifically in Part ILA, is that the federal bench is ideologically di-
verse in a way that can at least occasionally affect cases.
152 See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Chief
Justice's appointment power has not been considered contrary to Articles II and III of the Con-
stitution).
153 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64-74 (1993) (analyzing the processes and decisions of the Supreme
Court from an attitudinal prospective); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (positing that judicial minimalism, a form of judi-
cial restraint, causes a minimalist court to decide cases on narrow grounds, notably in the cases
regarding the right to die, affirmative action, sex and sexual orientation, and the First Amend-
ment and new technologies); Richard Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An
Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100
(2001) (showing empirically that D.C. Circuitjudges vote along ideological lines).
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personal ideology. 54 In this regard, the different special courts may
provide different constraints on, and opportunities for, the exercise
of individual judicial preferences. If we assume that different kinds
of rule schemes vary in their determinacy and in the degree of con-
straint they provide on adjudicative decision making, then the fact
that the courts at issue are subject-matter specialized means that some
might constrain judicial latitude more than others. Courts like ECA
or TECA (which adjudicate relatively technical rule schemes with cir-
cumscribed standards of review) may permit less space for the exer-
cise of judicial discretion than a court like FISA (which balances ab-
stract notions of national security and "probable cause"), or a body
like the D.C. Circuit Special Division (which was charged with select-
ing independent counsel). The Chief Justice's appointment discre-
tion is more problematic with respect to special courts that present
opportunities for the appointee judges to manifest their policy pref-
erences in outcomes.
A third requirement for potential strategic use of the appoint-
ment power is that these potentially relevant differences among lower
federal judges must be observable by the Chief Justice, at least in a
rough sense. If a Chief Justice prefers judges of a certain type on a
given special court, he must be able to identify the specific individuals
on the federal bench that are likely to embody those characteristics.
This criterion is not dependent on any absolute certainty or predict-
ability that the appointed judge will vote in accord with the observ-
able traits; judges frequently behave in ways that surprise their ap-
pointers, 55 and presumably this dynamic might also occur with
respect to judges designated by the Chief Justice. It is enough that
the Chief Justice can observe differences in judicial ideology that are
likely to be manifested on the special court. The Chief Justice has
several methods to ascertain such attitudes; he has all of the public
information about the nominating President and the judge's prior
public career that outside scholars have, and additional inside infor-
mation about judicial reputation (gleaned from other judges or di-
rectly in adjudicative or extramural interactions).156
154 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L.
REv. 1639, 1648 (2003) (noting that when "collegiality" was absent on the D. C. Circuit, "judges
of similar political persuasions too often sided with one another").
155Justice David Souter is one such example. See, e.g., Scott P. Johnson & Robert M. Alexan-
der, The Rehnquist Court and the Devolution of the Right to Privacy, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 645
(2003) (describing the manner in which Justice Souter has "surprised many conservatives with
his moderate to liberal voting record" after appointment by President George H.W. Bush in
1990).
16 The Chief Justice's ability to observe and ascertain the preferences of lower court judges
can take many forms;Judge David Sentelle, who headed the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit
that appointed Kenneth Starr, was a member of a regular poker game with Chief Justice
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Finally, even if all three of these elements exist, there is one final
link that must be in place to create the possibility of strategic use of
the appointment power to affect outcomes; the Chief Justice must be
able to match the observable attitudes of a given lower court judge
with the right kind of case where such attitudes can apply to the deci-
sion. A Chief Justice might wholly approve of a lower court judge's
view of the Fourth Amendment, but such synchronicity would be
largely irrelevant if the judge was appointed to hear a civil antitrust
suit, or even if the judge was to hear a random drawing of federal
cases. The incentive for strategic appointment behavior is much
higher where there is a close fit between judicial attitude and the type
of case; the presence of this dynamic makes the Chief Justice's special
court appointment power more problematic than the generalized
designation and transfer authority. When the Chief Justice transfers
a judge from one generalist court to another, the eclectic case mix-
ture and random selection mechanisms of these courts make it im-
possible to precisely match a judge with a case.' 57 Therefore, when
the transfer is between two generalist courts, the veil of subject matter
uncertainty obviates most of the potential for meaningful strategic al-
location of judges. The probability of just the right case coming to
the transferred judge in the new court is too slim to justify much stra-
tegic behavior, and where a designated judge temporarily vacates a
different generalist seat, there is always the chance that an important
case will come to the temporarily vacated seat. No such uncertainty
exists with special court appointments, where it is clear ex ante the
kinds of matters the appointees will consider. This foreknowledge,
coupled with the observable attitudinal differences in the pool of po-
tential appointees, vests the Chief Justice with some ability to use the
appointment power instrumentally. And, to the extent that the judi-
cial norm of reason-giving provides a constraint on judges in the ex-
ercise of their normal adjudicative function, it exerts no such influ-
ence with respect to this power.
b. The Norm of Collective Judicial Action
Beyond the absence of any articulated reasons for the appoint-
ment choices, there is another central feature of the Chief Justice's
appointment discretion that makes it distinct from the choices he
and other judges make in deciding cases-in a manner highly un-
Rehnquist. Ann Geracimos, D.C. Power Players Ponder Big Deals; Poker Game Offers Relaxation,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at Al.
1 For a comprehensive treatment of current case assignment practices in the federal circuit
courts, see J. Robert Brown & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment ofJudges at the Court of Ap-
peals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1069-79 (2000).
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usual within Article III's structure, the appointment discretion is un-
checked by other judges. It is commonplace to describe federal
judges as "unaccountable," in the sense that their decisions are insu-
lated from direct review of the political branches. But while the judi-
ciary may be "unaccountable" in this sense, almost all important ad-
judicative decisions that judges make are conditional on the approval
of other judges. For federal district judges, this intrabranch account-
ability relationship is vertical (review by a higher court), for Supreme
Court Justices it is horizontal (the collective vote of colleagues), and
for circuit judges it is in both directions. 5  These institutional fea-
tures of judicial action are independent of questions of individual ju-
dicial motivation, so even the ultra-attitudinalist would agree that a
judge's ability to translate personal preferences into final outcomes is
dependent on the consent of other judges.
Thus, even if judges' usual choices are not constrained by legal
rules at all, they are at least checked by other judges in a way that the
Chief Justice's unitary appointment authority is not. In concrete
terms, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view on Fourth Amendment ques-
tions does not always prevail in the Supreme Court, but his choices of
which federal judges would best apply the quasi-Fourth Amendment
standards of the FISA statute do prevail. To be sure, the Chief Jus-
tice's ability to manifest policy preferences into outcomes through
the special appointment power is constrained by other judges in a lit-
eral sense-the appointee judges themselves. But the grant to a sin-
gle individual of absolute discretion to select these appointees is a sig-
nificant step toward the Chief Justice's ability to promote probable
outcomes. The corporate feature of typical Article III decision mak-
ing often operates to blunt ideologically extreme positions, and also
may have a discourse-generating feature as judges who share alterna-
tive viewpoints explain their differences.
By placing the special court appointment power in a single offi-
cial, Congress fails to capture the benefits of collective judicial deci-
sion making-either in terms of ideological moderation or in terms
of its discourse-promoting effects. As I suggest below, some of the
normative qualms about this judicial appointment device would be
ameliorated simply by collectivizing the power. Congress could, for
instance, vest the special court appointment authority in the Supreme
Court as a whole, or in a broader group ofjudges such as the Federal
158 For scholarship that has explored the constraints this institutional setting places on indi-
vidual judicial discretion, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Pre-
cedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 823-25 (1994) (explaining hierarchical organization of Article III
judiciary) and McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory ofJudicial Decisions and the Rule
of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1641-48 (discussing influence of potential vertical review on
lower court judges' decisions).
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Judicial Conference, thereby avoiding the appearance or actuality of
individualistic policy-oriented behavior.
c. The Norm Against Specific Matching ofJudge and Case
The Chief Justice's appointment power is conceptually anomalous
in one more sense when measured against another baseline sur-
rounding the normal exercise of federal judicial power. Throughout
the federal judiciary, there exists a longstanding norm against specific
matching of certain judges with certain cases; instead, federal courts
employ random, mechanistic, or broadly categorical case assignment
mechanisms. Circuit chief judges generally do not select the judges
who will hear a specific appeal in the manner that the Chief Justice is
authorized to select particular federal judges to hear particular kinds
of matters on the specialized federal courts. Although nowhere tex-
tually specified, the strength of the anti-selection norm in the normal
operation of the federal judiciary is revealed by the rare instances
where it is allegedly breached. One example is the furor that ensued
on the Fifth Circuit in the 1960s when several judges accused the
court of "stacking" a series of panels in important civil rights cases.1 5 9
More recently, the strength of the norm against discretionary selec-
tion has come to public light in the Sixth Circuit's ongoing dispute
arising out of the en banc panel composition for the Michigan Law
School affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger.60 In a procedural
appendix to his dissent in that case, Judge Boggs accused the circuit's
ChiefJudge Martin of improperly handling the case in order to affect
the judges that would sit on the en banc panel;1 61 this charge subse-
quently produced an internal investigation. The severity of this
charge is instructive for the discussion here, as it ultimately alleges
the same kind of act (selecting specific judges for specific cases) that
Congress empowers the ChiefJustice to exercise.
The response from another Sixth Circuitjudge is also telling. In a
separate concurrence, Judge Moore disputed Judge Boggs's allega-
tions, but also stressed that the mere allegation that such strategic
behavior occurred was a severe threat to judicial legitimacy. Moore
noted that "[b]ecause we judges are unelected and serve during good
behavior, our only source of democratic legitimacy is the perception
that we engage in principled decision-making. ,1 62 In this context,
even the suggestion that ChiefJudge Martin had matched judges with
159 For a detailed discussion of this episode, see Brown & Lee, supra note 157, at 1043-65.
160 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
161 Id. at 811-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (accusing the Chief Judge of violating court rules by
failing to circulate the order for appeal and calling an irregular panel of judges to hear the
case).
162 Id. at 753 (Moore,J., concurring).
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cases could cause "grave harm... to this court and even to the Na-
tion as a whole," by "undermin [ing] public confidence in our ability
to perform our important role in American democracy.",6 3 Judge
Moore embraced the notion that it was profoundly inappropriate for
a judicial official to strategically match specific judges with specific
cases; furthermore, this impropriety was so deeply rooted in norms of
judicial power that a mere allegation of its occurrence was corrosive.
It is possible to elaborate this point further with a hypothetical in-
volving the Chief Justice's routine authority to transfer judges among
various federal courts of general jurisdiction to hear cases "by desig-
nation." I have argued here that although this formally resembles the
Chief Justice's power to appoint existing federal judges to a fixed
term on special federal courts, it is fundamentally different because
the Chief Justice has precise foreknowledge of the kinds of matters
his special appointees will decide upon; such knowledge is absent in
generalist transfers. The following counterfactual illustrates the dis-
tinction between the two powers, and (relatedly) the strength of the
norm against discretionary matching ofjudge and case. Imagine that
the Chief Justice could assign designee judges not merely to sit tem-
porarily on a different generalist court subject to the normal auto-
matic case assignment procedures of that court, but instead to hear
any and all cases of a specific kind that arose in that general court.
So, for instance, the Chief Justice would have the power to transfer a
handful of judges from other circuits to the Sixth Circuit, with the
mandate that "these judges shall hear only appeals involving constitu-
tional challenges to affirmative action during their temporary as-
signment, and they shall hear all such cases that arise in the circuit."
There is something profoundly wrong with such a power, and its
wrongness derives in large part from its departure from the deep-
seated norm against strategically matching specific judges with spe-
cific cases.
Now imagine that the Chief Justice transferred a number of exist-
ing federal judges to the District Court for the District of Columbia,
with the mandate that "these transferee judges, and only these
judges, shall rule on all government requests to undertake surveil-
lance for national security purposes." And for good measure, he se-
lected three circuit judges from the entire federal appellate judiciary
to sit by designation on the D.C. Circuit, with similarly exclusive ju-
risdiction over all national security surveillance cases. The objection
to this mandate derives not merely (or primarily) from its intrusion
into the lower courts' administrative autonomy, but rather from the
more substantive concern expressed above. The Chief Justice's
163 Id. at 752, 758.
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autonomous selection of hand-picked judges to hear all cases on a
particular kind of issue is inappropriate when measured against the
normal operation of, and theoretical basis for, the power to designate
judges to a different generalist court. But of course, this specific se-
lection is precisely what Congress authorized in establishing the FISA
courts and other similar tribunals. The Chief Justice commits no lit-
eral impropriety in carrying out the statutory command to fill up
these special courts, but specific congressional authorization of such
discretionary selection is nonetheless at odds with longstanding
norms of federal judicial administration.
3. A Subtle Encroachment
In the foregoing pages, I have argued that the Chief Justice's spe-
cial appointment power is incongruous with several express and cus-
tomary norms of Article III structure and practice. A related argu-
ment derives from the fact that the political nature of the power may
ultimately be subversive of the judiciary's stature and authority. A
standard principle of the separation of powers discourse is that a real-
location of functions is particularly disfavored if it works as an "en-
croachment" on one or more branches of government. 164 In policing
separation of power boundaries, the Court has often expressed its
role as providing a "safeguard against the encroachment or aggran-
dizement of one branch at the expense of the other.'' 165 It is perhaps
counterintuitive to conceive of the ChiefJustice's additional power to
appoint as a possible encroachment on the judiciary. At the most ba-
sic level, the net quantity of power reposed in Article III increases by
virtue of this delegation to the Chief Justice. A congressional deci-
sion to vest the ChiefJustice with additional authority to select special
court judges hardly seems like encroachment; or if it is encroach-
ment, it is of the President's baseline judicial nomination authority.66
1 See, e.g., Peter Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 507 (1987) (discussing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 770 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (considering whether a congressional action intruding
into executive function ultimately led to "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch
at the expense of the other.")); cf Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 603 (1984) ("Interpenetration of function
and competition among the branches... protect[s] liberty by preventing the irreversible accre-
tion of ultimate power in any one.").
165 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); see also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1989) (detailing the Court's "separation-of-powers jurisprudence"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating that the separa-
tion of powers confers on each branch the means "to resist encroachments of the others.").
166 This claim of encroachment on the executive was made in Cavanagh, and rejected by
Judge Kennedy on the grounds that the appointees had already been nominated and con-
firmed by the President and Senate. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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How, then, is this delegation perceived to "encroach" on the judi-
ciary? The first point is a general one-the grant of a public law
power is not purely gratuitous. The power to make an appointment
choice carries with it a duty to make such a choice. To the extent
such exercise entails difficult and controversial choices, there is a
burden alongside the benefit of this additional power.1 67 If this bur-
den is manifested in public criticism of specific appointment choices,
at one general level it is no more troubling to the Chief Justice than
to any other public official, and indeed may be less so given the Chief
Justice's life tenure. But at an institutional level there are features of
this criticism that are more injurious to a judicial official, and deriva-
tively to the judiciary generally, than similar attacks levied against the
President or the Senate.
The power and stature of the American judiciary is historically
dependent on public acceptance of its role and function. Lacking
the bureaucratic and enforcement mechanisms to impose its rules on
noncompliant actors, the judiciary depends on voluntary acquies-
cence from other government officials and the American people.
Judges cast their role as fundamentally different from, and above or-
dinary politics and through history have used this perception as the
primary mechanism for securing and retaining such public stature.'
Judicial decisions are accepted in large part because they are seen as
nonpolitical: they are more deliberative, more reasoned, more neu-
tral than the stuff of ordinary politics. In this way the legal reasoning
thatJustices engage in is important-even if it is in fact malleable and
indeterminate-because it makes judicial decisions seem less overtly
political. Much of the academic criticism of the Supreme Court's
Bush v. Gore169 opinion is phrased in these terms, accusing the Court
of squandering some of its prestige by engaging in a poorly-reasoned
political decision.7 Ajudicial choice of ajudge for a special court is,
167 Even Taft, who generally welcomed such influence as President and Chief Justice, noted
the burdens he felt from presidential exercise of the judicial appointment power: "'Oh John!
you don't know-you can't know-the difficulties of such responsibility as I have to exercise,
and how they burden a man's heart with the conflicting feelings prompted by duty and per-
sonal affection.'" Daniel S. McHargue, President Taft's Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J.
POL. 478, 484 (1950).
168 See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA.J. CONST. L.
945, 994 (2004) ("The Court's legitimacy stems from many sources ... [including] the insula-
tion ofjudges from ordinary politics ...
1W 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
170 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE
L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001) (describing the decision as "troubling because it suggested that the
Court was motivated by a particular kind of partisanship"); David Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What
Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 756 (2001) (describing how the Supreme Court
"splintered along ideological lines" in the decision, which in the author's view "was not a tri-
umph for the rule of law"); Lawrence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v.
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of course, of much less importance than the choice of a President.
Whatever one's view about the strength of Bush v. Gore's rationale,
there is certainly more there than what supports the Chief Justice's
unexpressed appointment choices. Although there is little public at-
tention to the Chief Justice's appointments when he makes them,
there is often pointed criticism of his choices in the wake of impor-
tant special court actions.
It may be that such additional criticism is of little damage given
the high stature of the current Supreme Court, even after Bush v.
Gore. 7 ' But a general reduction in the Court's prestige might render
this extra ground for critique more meaningful. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has presided over a Court at its apex in terms of public
stature, and he has also shown no disinclination to exercise the ap-
pointment power robustly. The Chief Justice who presided over the
Court at its most tenuous period in the twentieth century adopted a
very different position. Chief Justice Hughes, who waited out the
court-packing controversy of the 1930s and the attendant attacks on
the Court, did not desire additional powers that might generate addi-
tional criticism. However, in his efforts to maintain judicial stature
during and after that crisis, Hughes was adamant that he did not want
additional authority like the appointment power. He said that he
and the Justices "strongly opposed the imposition of that burden" of
additional administrative authority, which would "possibly mak[e] the
Chief Justice and the Court itself a center of attack.' 72 Hughes ob-
jected, on the grounds that it was "undue centralization," to the Chief
Justice receiving sole appointment power of the administrator of a
new office overseeing federal courts, and at his request that power
was vested with the entire Supreme Court.7 3 Instead of Taftian cen-
tralization, he advocated "greater attention to local authority and lo-
cal responsibility."74 By decentralizing the system, Hughes sought to
diminish the visibility of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court,
thereby warding off political attacks. 75 His colleague Felix Frank-
furter specifically praised Hughes's approach, noting that it "avoided
the temptations of a strong executive," and "realized fully that elabo-
Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 173 (2001) (noting "673 law professors who
denounced the Court right after it announced its stay").
171 Public opinion polls show that the Court remains highly regarded by Americans even after
Bush v. Gore. SeeJames L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise", 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 535 (2003) (suggesting "little if any
diminution of the Court's legitimacy in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore.").
17 Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act of
1939, 32J. POL. 599, 621 (1970) (footnote omitted).
173 Id. at 624 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. (footnote omitted).
175 This feature of Hughes's managerial style has been referred to as his "magic touch of de-
centralization." Id. at 626 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 7:2
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT POWER
ration of administrative machinery is deadening to the judicial proc-
ess." 76 Such concern may seem less poignant now, given the Su-
preme Court's high prestige, but that should not obscure the fact
that the appointment authority carries with it at least some potential
cost to the ChiefJustice and to judicial stature more broadly.
C. Alternative Devices
In the foregoing discussion, I highlighted several problems with
the special court appointment power that Congress has been willing
to give exclusively to the Chief Justice: it is an act of political discre-
tion exercised by a life-tenured official, it is unilateral, and it is exer-
cised without significant public debate or discourse. In the next few
paragraphs, I tentatively set forth several proposals that Congress
might implement to fill special court seats while addressing one or
more of the defects of the current system. Importantly, as the earlier
historical discussion illustrates, there is nothing inherent in the Chief
Justice's office that requires that Congress give the power of special
court appointment to him alone, or give it to the judicial branch at
all. This power represents a historical choice that Congress made to
shift a small part of the appointment power to the Chief Justice, and
it is a choice that Congress can revoke or reconfigure. The same
flexibility that permitted the delegation to the Chief Justice in the
first place permits alternate delegations to a different collection of
judges.
In much of the foregoing discussion, I have stressed the general
problems involved with placing the appointment choice with the ju-
diciary, and thus one obvious solution would be to appoint a federal
special court judge through the baseline nominate-and-consent pro-
cedure spelled out by Article Il. 7' This would have the aforemen-
tioned advantages of vesting the appointment decisions in politically
accountable branches, and sharing it among the President and the
Senate. Some of the judges of various specialized courts, like the Tax
Court, are appointed this way, even where they serve fixed, rather
than life, terms. There may be reasons, however, not to staff special
courts this way. Many of the courts are part-time in operation, so it is
most efficient to rotate existing Article III judges through the spots.
There is a different kind of reason why the normal Article II
nominate-and-consent model might be disfavored for special courts,
although this reason makes it more problematic to shift the power to
the Chief Justice. As I discuss above, the fact that the narrow subject
176 Felix Frankfurter, "The Administrative Side" of Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4
(1949).
1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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matter of these courts is known ex ante freights the specific appoint-
ment choice with additional strategic importance-the appointing
officials know with certainty on what kind of matter the appointee
will rule. When the appointment choice is consigned to the political
branches, this results in a process that is potentially more overtly poli-
ticized with respect to specific cases than normal judicial appoint-
ments; this potential may provide ajustification for shifting the power
to the the judiciary.
Even if the special court appointment power remained in the ju-
diciary, however, provision for a collective appointment authority
would remove the problem of unilateralism discussed above. One
type of reform that would still entail a judicial choice of special court
appointees would vest the appointment choice in a group of Article
IIIjudges. This could be the Supreme Court as a whole; indeed, past
statutes and unenacted proposals have embodied this method. It
would be possible to vest this appointment function in a collective ju-
dicial body, such as the Supreme Court, the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence, the chief judges of the federal circuits, or some other adminis-
trative subset. One precursor bill to the independent counsel regime
embraced such a collective appointment mechanism, and would have
vested power to appoint special prosecutors in the District Court for
the District of Columbia sitting en banc, without any involvement by
the Chief Justice.178 An early congressional proposal involving the
comptroller general would have vested power to appoint that official
in the Court as a whole. 79 There is some precedent for this method
(for example, the Sentencing Commission members, who are nomi-
nated by the Federal Judicial Conference), and the collective nature
of the choice would provide a structural check on individual strategic
behavior. Such a collective approval requirement would provide a
check on unbridled discretion even if the Chief Justice was, in prac-
tice, the official who made selections in the first instance. For exam-
ple, although the ChiefJustice takes the lead in assigning the justices
as "circuit justices" to particular jurisdictions, it is the Court as a
whole that must order those assignments, thus providing a latent
check on the ChiefJustice's discretion.80
178 See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601,
609 (1998) (describing Senator Bayh's proposal).
179 See 59 CONG. REC. 8647, 8647-57 (June 5, 1920). The House of Representatives debated
H.R. 14441, which provided in part for a comptroller general "who shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court of the United States" and who "may be removed at any time by the Supreme
Court" for various causes. Id. at 8648.
180 See 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2004) ("The Chief Justice of the United States and the associate jus-
tices of the Supreme Court shall from time to time be allotted as circuit justices among the cir-
cuits by order of the Supreme Court.") (emphasis added). Only when the Court is out of session is
the ChiefJustice empowered to make such assignments without the Court's approval. Id.
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The alternative to collectivizing the choice is more fundamental-
it would remove all possibility of strategic selection by making the se-
lection of special court judges either random, or via a mechanical
application of a universal principle (like seniority, for example,
whereby every active federal judge would serve for a time on a special
court after ten years of service)*81 Such automatic seniority triggers
are not rare in federal judicial administration-an existing applica-
tion is the statutory mechanism for selecting the chief judges of the
circuit courts, which provides that
[t]he chief judge of the circuit shall be the circuit judge in regular active
service who is senior in commission of those judges who (A) are sixty-four
years of age or under; (B) have served for one year or more as a circuit
judge; and (C) have not served previously as a chiefjudge.1
2
Such devices may seem distressingly mechanical, but in a conceptual
sense they are actually more faithful to the mythic ideal of federal ju-
dicial interchangeability than the Chief Justice's allocation authority,
which is likewise historically rooted in that same fiction. If judges are
truly interchangeable, then a random selection method does not
produce a negative outcome; conversely, if judges are not fungible
(and few think they are), random selection at least creates a veil in
the assignment mechanism that avoids the strategic dangers of the
current system.
Finally, whether or not Congress chooses a different appointment
mechanism for specialized courts in the future, for the foreseeable
future the Chief Justice will continue to exercise this discretion with
respect to a number of special courts. This leads to one final sugges-
tion geared specifically to the Senate Judiciary Committee. When the
current Chief Justice retires, the Senate will hold confirmation hear-
ings on the President's new nominee. Undoubtedly, the Judiciary
Committee members will question the nominee about his or her ju-
dicial philosophy relative to important constitutional and policy ar-
eas. During this process, the Judiciary Committee may also wish to
take note of the small but significant component of the office's ad-
ministrative authority explored here, and expressly question the
nominee about how he or she would go about choosing judges for
specialized courts, just as a Chief Justice nominee would field ques-
tions about other aspects of judicial administration.
181 Rochelle Dreyfuss proposed some of these measures in a 1990 article on special court ad-
judication. See Dreyfuss, supra note 74, at 377 (arguing that specialized courts could, "at least in
theory, enable the judiciary to meet the nation's adjudication needs effectively, and may even
produce benefits of its own.").
182 28 U.S.C. § 45 (2004).
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III. THE APPOINTMENT CHOICES OF RECENT CHIEFJUSTICES
In the previous section, I made the argument that the congres-
sional decision to vest exclusive special court appointment authority
in the Chief Justice is problematic because there is no structural bal-
ancing device to prevent the Chief from exercising that power in a
strategic way to affect outcomes. The foregoing argument is not de-
pendant on actual empirical proof that any ChiefJustices have sought
to advance their substantive issue preferences through their special
court appointment choices-the power is problematic because of the
potential to do so, whether latent or not. Of course, this theoretical
criticism gains some additional traction if the actual record of ap-
pointments by particular ChiefJustices suggests evidence of such stra-
tegic behavior. This section attempts-in a very blunt aggregative
sense-to examine that specific factual question.
The proliferation in the 1970s of special courts that were filled
with judges chosen by the Chief Justice"83 means that two particular
men-Warren Burger and William Rehnquist-have made signifi-
cantly more appointments, across a greater swath of specialized tri-
bunals, than any of their predecessors. Chief Justice Burger made
seventy appointments to five different specialized courts, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist has made at least fifty-six such selections. The ap-
pointment activity of these two Chief Justices is also relatively recent
and thus, although apparently never before collected into a single
list, basic information on their choices is generally ascertainable with
a bit of research. A list of particular appointments that both men
made is organized chronologically by court and presented in an Ap-
pendix to this Article.
8 4
This appointment record is potentially interesting in that it may
shed a new kind of light on the ongoing debates among political sci-
entists and legal academics over the factors that motivate judicial de-
cision making. 1 5 Although unanimous on little else, this body of lit-
erature has understandably focused on judicial behavior manifested
in voting on actual judicial decisions, and not on extralegal judicial
behavior such as the Chief Justice's choices in making appointments.
More sophisticated models have recently challenged the long popular
183 These courts were TECA, FISA, FISA Court of Review, and the Special Division of the D.C.
Circuit for independent counsel appointment. See supra Part I.B (providing information on
each court, the ability of the Chief Justice to appoint the judges from each court, and the sig-
nificance of that appointment power).
184 For a description of the various sources used to compile the Appendix, see infra, note 197.
185 Useful summaries of these debates can be found in Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a
Strategic Revolution inJudicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000), and
Michael Heise, The Past, Present and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making
and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 833-43 (2002).
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"attitudinal" model of judicial decision making,18 6 arguing that judges
are often limited from voting their sincere preferences by strategic
constraints, such as those imposed by other branches of govern-
ment,"' by norms of precedent, or stare decisis.5 s The Chief Justice's
appointment discretion is interesting in the context of this debate
because it is so obviously unconstrained by case law precedent, and
perhaps also unconstrained by strategic interaction with the other
branches. Filling these judicial vacancies is, it would seem, an area
where the Chief Justice could implement his or her policy prefer-
ences without meaningful constraint. The obvious question then be-
comes: have ChiefJustices Rehnquist and Burger done so?
A definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, and may be difficult to ascertain even with more focused analy-
sis. It is difficult to assess judicial ideology precisely with clear exter-
nal markers, and so any assessment of the actual judges chosen by the
Chief Justice is fraught with some uncertainty. The party of the ap-
pointing President is one such overly blunt measure. Consider, for
instance, thatJustice John Paul Stevens, a consistently "liberal"8 9 voter
on the current Supreme Court, was appointed by President Ford, and
so would be coded as a "Republican" appointee under any such
analysis. Such blunt analysis should be employed with appropriate
caution, especially for this relatively small sample set of judges.
Nonetheless, in the large body of empirical political science literature
on the lower federal courts, the party of the appointing President
remains a widely recognized, if crude, metric from which to assess the
composition of courts.19° Over a sufficient number of judges, studies
show that this rough party identification can affect voting behavior.
This variable also has one feature that explains its academic popular-
ity: it is easily and objectively available for every Article IIIjudge.
186 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 64-74 (Cambridge University Press 1993) (analyzing the processes and decisions of the
Supreme Court from an attitudinal prospective).
187 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (assessing the implications for statutory interpretation that arise in the
context of the interaction between Congress, the President, and the Court).
188 See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018
(1996) (arguing that, as a norm, stare decisis manifests itself throughout the decision-making
process).
189 The standard attitudinal coding terms "liberal" and "conservative" are, of course, also
overly blunt in many cases.
190 For a comprehensive collection of eighty-four studies measuring party and judicial ideol-
ogy, see Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20
JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (concluding that "[c]umulating and synthesizing empirical find-
ings... confirm conventional wisdom that party is a dependable measure of ideology in mod-
ern American courts" and that "Democratic judges indeed are more liberal on the bench than
Republican counterparts.").
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Applying this party-based method of analysis to the appointments
made by Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist yields results that ap-
pear striking at first glance, but are less so relative to the background
pool of all federal judges at the relevant times. In raw percentage
terms, Chief Justice Rehnquist's special court appointments were
much more likely to be Republican appointees than the correspond-
ing group of Burger special court judges. A full 74% of judges se-
lected by Chief Justice Rehnquist were appointed by Republican
presidents, compared to fewer than half of Burger's appointments
(46%) .19
There is an important qualifier here-although Chief Justice
Rehnquist predominantly appointed Republicans, he made his ap-
pointments from a federal judicial pool that, for most of his tenure as
Chief Justice, had been primarily Republican appointed, sometimes
overwhelmingly so. Still, Rehnquist's 74% rate exceeds even the
high-water mark of this trend, which occurred at the end of the first
Bush administration in 1992, when 72.2% of the lower federal bench
(circuit and district judges) was Republican appointed. 192 William
Rehnquist became the ChiefJustice in 1986. In 1988, the percentage
of Republican appointees in the lower federal courts was 61.2%, and
by 1992 it was 72.2%. Yet during the eight years of President Clin-
ton's tenure this figure gradually decreased, and by the year 2000
Democrat-appointed judges comprised a slight majority of the federal
bench. Chief Justice Rehnquist's appointment patterns show a ten-
dency to select Republican appointees that slightly exceeds these
fluctuating background rates. This feature of his appointment record
can be explained partly by the baseline composition of the federal
judiciary, but other factors may also influence his choices.
Beyond this blunt party-based analysis, there is also evidence of
appointment practices that are consistent with more sophisticated
and nuanced strategic behavior by both ChiefJustices. Consider the
three-judge Special Division of the D.C. Circuit that was empowered
to select independent counsels and to define their jurisdiction. Be-
cause the independent counsel investigates the sitting Executive
Branch, and because there is no corpus of selection criteria to con-
strain judicial discretion in the way that case law is said to operate, it
is plausible that the judges on the Special Division exercise an un-
usual degree of discretion where their individual preferences might
matter. If this is true, then the choice of which judges and which
preferences comprise the panel is a critical one vested with the Chief
Justice.
191 See tbls.1 & 2 infra p. 393 (detailing the Burger and Rehnquist appointments).
192 See Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228,
253 (2001).
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TABLE 1: BURGER APPOINTMENTS
BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Court Republicans Democrats
JPMDL 4 7
TECA 16 23
Special Division 3 2
FISA Court 7 5
FISA Court of 2 1
Review
Total (70) 32 (46%) 38 (54%)
TABLE 2: REHNQUIST APPOINTMENTS
BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Court Republicans Democrats
JPMDL 13 3
Special Division 4 2
FISA Court 16 9
FISA Court of 6
Review
Alien Terrorist 4 1
Removal
Total (58) 43 (74%) 15 (26%)
Both Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist placed
more Republican appointees on the Special Division than Democrat
appointees, but the skew is not overwhelming. For Burger it was
three of five (60%), and for Rehnquist it was four of six (66.7%). As I
explained above, these numbers do not-standing alone-
demonstrate clear ideological behavior by either Chief Justice, and
they come close to replicating the background composition of the
federal judiciary, at least during the Rehnquist years. However, there
is a pattern to the distribution of these appointments that appears
non-random. The Special Division sat for twenty-two years, and for
all but 1.5 of those years the panel breakdown was precisely the same:
two Republican appointees and one Democrat. '93 Although the ag-
193 See John Q. Barrett, Special Division Agonistes, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 17, 44 (2000) (listing
the Special Division judges and their independent counsel appointees from 1978 through
2000); Kenn G. Kern, The Special Division of the Court and the Independent Counsel Arrangement:
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gregate figures look proportional enough-over a third of those cho-
sen by two conservative Chief Justices were Democrat-appointed
judges-the allocation of those appointments meant that for over
twenty of the Division's twenty-two years, Republican appointees were
a majority of the three-judge panel."'
Finally, as noted above, Nixon-appointee Warren Burger actually
used his special court appointment power as Chief Justice to select
more Democrat-appointed judges than Republican appointees to
these posts. However, Burger's Democrat appointees were not ran-
domly spaced across all of the special courts whose spots he filled.
Thirty of the thirty-eight Democrat-appointed judges that Burger se-
lected were placed on either the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation ('JPMDL") or the Temporary Court of Appeals ("TECA")-
bodies whose decisional authority is confined to relatively specific
fields and perhaps also channeled by relatively more neutral techni-
cal standards than other types of special courts (or, even if this as-
sumption is unfounded, perhaps Chief Justice Burger perceived such a
distinction, which in turn guided his appointment behavior). In con-
trast, the twenty appointments that Burger made to the Special Divi-
sion (itself performing the largely political task of selecting inde-
pendent counsels) and the FISA Court and Review Court (which
balance national security needs, civil liberties, and weigh incomplete
evidentiary claims in deciding whether to issue a warrant) were pre-
dominantly Republican appointees. This contrasts with the TECA
and JPMDL, where only forty percent of the Burger selections were
Republican appointees. This record suggests that Chief Justice Bur-
ger may have employed a different kind of appointment criterion de-
pending on the particular subject matter that his appointees would
decide and, relatedly, the degree of attitudinal discretion that they
would potentially exercise. "
In addition to the foregoing analysis, it is possible to make a few
normative suggestions regarding the Chief Justice's exercise of his
appointment authority. As I detailed in Part II, much of the theoreti-
cal difficulty with this exercise of authority derives from the vesting of
an inherently discretionary act in an official that is insulated from ac-
countability for his actions. I have suggested that Congress might be
more sparing in its delegation of this power, and might do so in the
future in a manner that reduces the unconstrained discretion given
to one particular jurist. But many of the same discretion-confining
techniques advocated earlier (seniority, random selection, group se-
Safeguarding the Appearance ofJudicial Impartiality, 4 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REv. 39, 42 (1998) (listing
the Special Division judges from 1978 through 1998).
194 See app. A infra pp. 397-402 (listing the Burger and Rehnquist appointments).
195 Id.
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lection by the judicial conference, or the Supreme Court as a whole)
might be adopted voluntarily-even if only in a non-binding advisory
capacity-by a Chief Justice seeking to avoid the appearance of uni-
lateral partiality.
A separate area for reform would be greater transparency in the
actual appointments made, if not also for the candidates under con-
sideration. The research for this Article has underscored the fact that
the Chief Justice's special court appointments are not collected and
published regularly in the same place.9 6 A step beyond ex-post publi-
cation of appointment choices would be a Chief Justice's announce-
ment of several potential judges for a soon to be vacant special court
seat. It would be a useful discourse-generating technique for the
Chief Justice to issue a slate of potential appointees to, for example,
the FISA Court, and receive commentary from bar groups and the
broader public. All of this would shed light on the exercise of a
power that currently is largely outside of public view until long after
the appointment choices are made.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored a particular kind of power exercised by a
particular American judge. Like much judicial action, the appoint-
ment authority exercised by the Chief Justice entails the application
of significant discretion. But unlike the normal choices that judges
make in deciding cases, the Chief Justice's appointment discretion is
unchecked by the votes of colleagues or by a reviewing court, and is
also unfettered by the doctrinal and textual factors that may constrain
ordinary judicial decision making. There is some evidence that the
two Chief Justices who have exercised this power of appointment
most often have occasionally used it to advance their substantive pol-
icy preferences. As I argued above, these concerns counsel against
regular congressional use of the power in connection with new spe-
cial courts.
On this point, there is one more way that the special appointment
power of the Chief Justice differs from the ordinary work that judges
do. The discretion exercised by life-tenured judges in their normal
adjudicative function may be a problematic "difficulty" in theory and
practice, but it is a difficulty that is inherent in the basic dualist struc-
ture of American democracy, and one that many feel is preferable to
an alternative regime of absolute legislative supremacy. In contrast,
there is nothing inherent or necessary about vesting the Chief Justice
196 Many, but not all, such appointments are announced sporadically in The Third Branch, an
official periodical publication of the federal judiciary, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
ttb/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
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alone with the power to fill up special court positions. This appoint-
ment device represents a policy choice by Congress, and is a choice
that Congress can, and should, employ more cautiously in the future.
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APPENDIX A
THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST APPOINTMENTS '97
TABLE 1: JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Burger Appointments
Appointee Year
Andrew A. Caffy
Murray I. Gurfein
Roy W. Harper
Charles R. Weiner
Edward S. Northrop
Robert H. Schnacke
Frederick A. Daugherty
Sam C. Pointer,Jr.
S. Hugh Dillin
Louis H. Pollak
Milton Pollack
1975
1979
Home Court
D. Mass.
2d Cir.
1979 E.D. & W.D. Mo.
1979 E.D. Pa.
1979
1979
1980
1980
1980
D. Md.
N.D. Cal.
W.D., E.D. & N.D. Okla.
N.D. Ala.
S.D. Ind.
1980 E.D. Pa.
1980 S.D.N.Y.
Appointing President
Eisenhower
Nixon
Truman
Johnson
Kennedy
Nixon
Kennedy
Nixon
Kennedy
Carter
Johnson
Rehnquist Appointments
Appointee Year Home Court Appointing President
Halbert 0. Woodward 1989 N.D. Tex. Johnson
John F. Nangle 1990 E.D. Mo. Nixon
Robert R. Merhige,Jr. 1990 E.D. Va. Johnson
William B. Enright 1990 S.D. Cal. Nixon
Clarence A. Brimmer 1992 D. Wy. Ford
John F. Grade 1992 N.D. Ill. Ford
Barefoot Sanders 1992 N.D. Tex. Carter
197 Data on the special court appointments presented here is not compiled in any one official
or secondary source, and apparently (based on telephone and email requests by the author) is
not kept in comprehensive unofficial form by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts or the
Federal Judicial Center. Accordingly, the information in this Appendix was compiled through
detailed chronological review of several sources: (1) The Third Branch, an official periodical of
the federal judiciary, which often published individual special court appointments when made;
(2) the introductory pages of the bound West Federal Reporters (e.g., "F.2d" and "F.Supp"),
which include lists of current members of some special courts; (3) the Federal Judicial Center's
judicial biography database, found at http://www.fc.gov; (4) the judicial biographical informa-
tion contained in electronic editions of the West Legal Directory and the Almanac of the Fed-
eral Judiciary; and (5) individual media reports recounting relevant appointments.
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Rehnquist Appointments
Appointee
Louis C. Bechtle
John F. Keenan
William T. Hodges
Morey L. Sear
Bruce M. Selya
Julia S. Gibbons
D. LowellJensen
J. Frederick Motz
Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Year
1994
1998
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2003
Home Court
E.D. Pa.
S.D.N.Y.
M.D. Fla.
E.D. La.
1st Cir.
W.D. Tenn.
N.D. Cal.
D. Md.
N.D. Ind.
Appointing President
Nixon
Reagan
Nixon
Ford
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
TABLE 2: TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
Burger Appointments
Appointee
John S. Hastings
William H. Hastie
Martin D. Van Oosterhout
Robert P. Anderson
James M. Carter
Frank M. Johnson
Edward A. Tamm
Joe Ewing Estes
A. Sherman Christensen
William J. Jameson
Joe McDonald Ingraham
Robert A. Grant
William H. Becker
Walter E. Hoffman
Herbert P. Sorg
Walter P. Gewin
John K- Regan
Dudley B. Bonsal
Alfonso J. Zirpoli
Frederick B. Lacey
Earl R. Larson
Lewis R. Morgan
John W. Peck
Charles M. Metzner
Year
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
Home Court
7th Cir.
3d Cir.
8th Cir.
2d Cir.
9th Cir.
5th Cir.
D.C. Cir.
N.D. Tex.
D. Utah
D. Mont.
5th Cir.
N.D. Ind.
W.D. Mo.
E.D. Va.
W.D. Pa.
5th Cir.
E.D. Mo.
S.D.N.Y.
N.D. Cal.
D. N.J.
D. Minn.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
S.D.N.Y.
Appointing President
Eisenhower
Truman
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Truman
Eisenhower
Truman
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Nixon
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Eisenhower
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Appointee
Ben Cushing Duniway
Edward T. Gignoux
Sam C. Pointer,Jr.
Stanley A. Weigel
Wesley E. Brown
Adrian A. Spears
Robert W. Hemphill
Robert E. Maxwell
J. Skelly Wright
Reynaldo Garza
Frederick A. Daugherty
Homer Thornberry
ThomasJ. MacBride
Morey L. Sear
Ray McNichols
Year
1979
1980
1980
1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
Home Court
9th Cir.
D. Me.
N.D. Ala.
N.D. Cal.
D. Kan.
W.D. Tex.
D.S.C.
N.D. Va.
D.C. Cir.
5th Cir.
W.D., E.D. & N.D. Okla.
5th Cir.
E.D. Cal.
E.D. La.
D. Idaho
Appointing President
Kennedy
Eisenhower
Nixon
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Johnson
Johnson
Truman
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Ford
Johnson
TABLE 3: SPECIAL DIVISION FOR THE PURPOSE
OF APPOINTING INDEPENDENT COUNSELS (D.C. CIRCUIT)
Burger Appointments
Appointee Year Home Court Appointing President
Roger Robb 1978 D.C. Cir. Nixon
J. Edward Lumbard 1978 2d Cir. Eisenhower
Lewis R. Morgan 1978 5th Cir. Kennedy
Walter R. Mansfield 1984 2d Cir. Johnson
George E. MacKinnon 1985 D.C. Cir. Nixon
Rehnquist Appointments
Appointee Year Home Court Appointing President
Wilbur F. Pell, Jr.
John D. Butzner, Jr.
David B. Sentelle
Joseph T. Sneed
Peter T. Fay
Richard D. Cudahy
1987
1988
1992
1994
1994
1998
7th Cir.
4th Cir.
D.C. Cir.
9th Cir.
11th Cir.
7th Cir.
Nixon
Kennedy
Reagan
Nixon
Ford
Carter
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT POWER
Burger Appointments
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TABLE 4: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT COURT
Burger Appointments
Appointee
Albert V. Bryan Jr.
Frederick B. Lacey
Lawrence W. Pierce
FrankJ. McGarr
George L. Hart
James H. Meredith
ThomasJ. MacBride
William C. O'Kelley
Dudley B. Bonsal
Fred A. Daugherty
EdwardJ. Devitt
Edward S. Northrop
Year
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1981
1981
1984
1985
Home Court
E.D. Va.
D.N.J.
S.D.N.Y.
N.D. I11.
D.D.C.
E.D. Mo.
E.D. Cal.
N.D. Ga.
S.D.N.Y.
W.D. Okla.
D. Minn.
D. Md.
Appointing President
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Kennedy
Nixon
Kennedy
Kennedy
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Rehnquist Appointments
Appointee
Conrad K Cyr
James E. Noland
Joyce H. Green
Robert W. Warren
Wendell A. Miles
Frank Freedman
Ralph G. Thompson
Charles Schwartz,Jr.
Earl H. Carroll
James C. Cacheris
John F. Keenan
Royce C. Lamberth
William Stafford
Stanley S. Brotman
Harold A. Baker
MichaelJ. Davis
John Edward Conway
Claude M. Hilton
James G. Garr
Year
1987
1987
1988
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2000
2001
Home Court
D. Me.
S.D. Ind.
D.D.C.
E.D. Wis.
W.D. Mich.
D. Mass.
W.D. Okla.
E.D. La.
D. Ariz.
E.D. Va.
S.D.N.Y.
D.D.C.
N.D. Fla.
D.N.J.
C.D. Ill.
D. Minn.
D.N.M.
E.D. Va.
N.D. Ohio
Appointing President
Reagan
Johnson
Carter
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Ford
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Ford
Ford
Carter
Clinton
Reagan
Reagan
Clinton
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Appointee
Nathaniel M. Gorton
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
James Robertson
Robert Broomfield
George Kazen
Dee Benson
Year Home Court
2001 D. Mass.
2002 D.D.C.
2002 D.D.C.
2003 D. Ariz.
2003 S.D. Tex.
2004 D. Utah
Appointing President
Bush"'
Clinton
Clinton
Reagan
Carter
Bush
TABLE 5: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
COURT OF REVIEW
Burger Appointments
Appointee Year Home Court Appointing President
James E. Barrett 1979 10th Cir. Nixon
George E. MacKinnon 1979 D.C. Cir. Nixon
A.L. Higginbotham,Jr. 1979 3d Cir. Carter
Rehnquist Appointments
Appointee Year Home Court Appointing President
Bobby R. Baldock 1992 10th Cir. Reagan
Paul H. Roney 1994 11th Cir. Nixon
Laurence H. Silberman 1996 D.C. Cir. Reagan
Ralph B. Guy 1998 6th Cir. Reagan
Edward Leavy 2001 9th Cir. Reagan
Ralph K. Winter, Jr. 2003 2d Cir. Reagan
198 All "Bush" appointees in this table were appointed by George Herbert Walker Bush.
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT POWER
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TABLE 6: ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT
Rehnquist Appointments
Appointee
Earl H. Carroll
David D. Dowd,Jr.
William C. O'Kelley
Michael A. Telesca
Alfred M. Wolin
Year Home Court
1996 D. Ariz.
1996 N.D. Ohio
1996 N.D. Ga.
1996 W.D.N.Y.
1996 D.NJ.
Appointing President
Carter
Reagan
Nixon
Reagan
Reagan
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